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Implications of the vote to leave the European Union 
This chapter was written before the results of the EU Referendum were known. Leaving the 
European Union is unlikely to change the overall scale of current and future risks from climate 
change, but in some areas it may affect policies and programmes important to address climate-
related vulnerabilities. 
If such policies and programmes are changed, it will be necessary for new UK measures to 
achieve the same or improved outcomes to avoid an increase in risk. The Adaptation Sub-
Committee will consider the impact of the EU Referendum and the Government’s response in its 
next statutory progress report on the UK National Adaptation Programme, to be published in 
June 2017. 
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Key messages 
The three key dimensions of international risks and opportunities discussed in this chapter are (1) 
the global food system, (2) migration and displacement, and (3) geopolitical issues.   
The causes and consequences of these risks and opportunities are inter-related. Managing the risks 
depends on co-ordination of information and knowledge across government departments, as well as 
international co-operation and multi-lateral processes. European-level institutions and interventions are 
also critical for the management of many of the risks in this chapter. However, there are significant 
policy gaps in harmonising development, migration and food policies; and in strategically producing 
and using knowledge and data. 
Table 7.1 lists the key risks/opportunities and urgency scores identified for this chapter. More action is 
needed to: 
• Manage the risks to UK food prices and trade from climate impacts overseas (It1 and It3).
While the absolute availability of food is unlikely to be an issue for the UK as a whole in the future,
UK food prices have been, and are likely to be, affected by extreme weather events overseas. Price
increases disproportionately affect lower income households, as well as sensitive businesses.
Managing the risk to food prices is likely to require strategic, national coordination and planning to
manage the resilience of the UK food system, encompassing domestic and international production
and trade. There is currently no Government strategy encompassing domestic and international
food systems and no overarching role coordinating expertise and actions from the large range of
government departments (BIS, DECC, DFID, FCO, FSA, DoH, etc.), academia and industry required to
ensure systemic food system resilience.
• Foster adaptation to climate change outside the UK (It1-It6). This includes the coordination of
development assistance with the EU to reduce risks of migration and conflict in other regions; the
development of common strategies and harmonised policies for biosecurity risks; providing
assistance to people displaced due to weather-related extremes in their home countries; and on
agreed policies with the EU on variations in food availability and price spikes in global food
commodities.
Table 7.1. International risks and urgency scores 
Risk/opportunity 
(relevant section(s) of 
chapter) 
More 
action 
needed 
Research 
priority 
Sustain 
current 
action 
Watching 
brief 
Rationale for score 
It1: Risks from 
weather-related 
shocks to international 
food production and 
trade (7.2) 
UK At the present, there is no co-
ordinated national approach to 
ensure the resilience of the UK 
food system. Coordinated 
approaches require broad 
participation across policy, 
industry and research.  
It2: Imported food 
safety risks (7.2) 
UK There is a gap in surveillance 
systems to monitor food safety 
at source and through complex 
international supply chains. 
It3: Risks and 
opportunities from 
long-term, climate-
related changes in 
global food 
production (7.2) 
UK The UK may increase its 
comparative advantage in 
specific areas of agricultural 
production in the future. Trends 
in global agricultural production 
and consumption need further 
monitoring and assessment. 
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It4: Risks to the UK 
from climate-related 
international human 
displacements (7.3) 
UK 
A more proactive strategy to 
work in partnership with other 
countries is needed to provide 
rapid legal and basic assistance 
to migrants and to build long-
term resilience in exposed 
regions. Otherwise overseas 
development efforts will 
increasingly be diverted to 
provide humanitarian (i.e. 
emergency) aid. 
It5: Risks to the UK 
from international 
violent conflict (7.4) 
UK 
Further evidence is needed to 
understand the appropriate 
balance between long-term 
development aid (resilience 
building, disaster risk reduction, 
state stability) and responsive 
interventions (peace-keeping, 
humanitarian aid). 
It6: Risks to 
international law and 
governance (7.4) 
UK There is a lack of systematic 
monitoring and strategic 
planning to address the 
potential for breakdown in 
foreign national and 
international governance and 
inter-state rivalry, caused by 
shortages in resources that are 
sensitive to climate change. 
It7: Opportunities 
from changes in 
international trade 
routes (7.4) 
UK Potential changes in trade routes 
are already being assessed and 
the issue should continue to be 
monitored. 
Food system resilience (It1, It2, It3) 
The absolute availability of food is not likely to be an issue for the UK as a whole as a 
consequence of climate change. However, as the international food system becomes more 
vulnerable, food prices in the UK could become more liable to price spikes. This would create 
risks for households and farmers by impacting on their ability to purchase basic goods and 
livestock feed, respectively. 
A resilient food system ensures that safe and nutritious food is available and affordable. The UK food 
system encompasses domestic food production (see Chapter 3) and international imports of raw and 
processed food, including livestock feed. Adaptation efforts focused on the UK’s domestic production of 
food will have only marginal success because of the global interconnected nature of food systems, and 
the current pressures on domestic resources such as water and soils (see Chapter 3). 
The UK food system is affected by short-term climate shocks disrupting production and supply chains, 
mainly through price spikes (It1). The impact of future global production shocks on the UK will depend 
on many internal and external factors, including UK and foreign government responses, which have the 
potential to offset or amplify risk. The UK farming industry and lower income households are particularly 
vulnerable to shocks. Current evidence and past events suggest that the market is not likely to adapt 
without affecting UK businesses and consumers negatively in the process. There is currently no  
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Government food security strategy encompassing domestic and international food systems; and no 
organisation has overarching responsibility for ensuring UK food security.   
Direct impacts to food safety through contamination or substitution of imports can also occur (It2). 
Changes in climate and geopolitics, coupled with the complex and international nature of supply 
chains, mean that addressing food safety through monitoring points of entry alone is unlikely to be an 
effective strategy.  
Longer-term threats to the UK food system (It3) arise through changes in the global distribution of 
agricultural produce and associated trade disruption, which are only partially predictable. Global 
changes in agricultural production could be offset, for example, by increases in production in specific 
geographical areas, but would be subject to substantial investments in infrastructure and trade-offs in 
water resources. The impact of long-term changes also depends on other factors such as changes in 
population geography and consumption.  
Addressing the UK-facing risks posed by climate change to international food systems would increase 
the country’s resilience to exogenous economic and political shocks, as well as bringing sustainability 
and health co-benefits. It would also help address the risks of increased overseas conflict, migration and 
geopolitical instability posed by climate change. The UK is well-positioned to be a global leader in 
strategic long-term thinking on international dimensions of resilience, sustainability and risk reduction. 
The business case for action on climate change is increasingly recognised by the private sector. There is 
a significant opportunity to use adaptation to climate change as a catalyst for actions to improve food 
system functioning, and increase systemic resilience. 
Displacement and migration (It4) 
The principal, immediate implication for the UK of populations around the world displaced 
because of climate change impacts is increased demand for humanitarian assistance. There are 
longer term consequences of political instability and economic changes associated with 
populations movements globally. Policy intervention is required to increase cooperation with EU 
states on migration and build mechanisms to facilitate assistance, settlement or return of 
displaced populations.  
Climate change impacts around the world are likely to lead to the movement of populations impacted 
by extreme weather events, and ultimately to changes to the geography of economic activity and 
settlement patterns. In the future, significant unplanned migration flows will be more likely as a result of 
extreme weather events. Weather-related displacement of people from their homes is, most often, of 
short duration and short distance. The UK is potentially less susceptible to inward international 
migration flows than other countries due to its location, although it is dependent on EU migration 
policies that regulate migration flows. But displacement has significant human and economic costs. It 
can also induce unplanned, permanent migrations in some cases. The current gap in policies and formal 
mechanisms (the so-called ‘protection gap’) leaves migrants in need of legal recognition, primary 
assistance, safe relocation or return. Displacements affect the UK by increasing demand for 
humanitarian assistance and affecting UK economic interests abroad. They also impact on other 
geopolitical risks such as conflict. 
Geopolitical risks (It5, It6) 
Projections suggest that the demand for humanitarian assistance, partly due to climate change, 
will increase significantly in the coming decades, challenging the balance between meeting 
short-term demand and building long-term resilience in disaster-prone regions. Research is 
needed to understand the impact of existing funding mechanisms in building long-term 
resilience and stability. 
Political tensions between states, the threat of violent conflict and the need for international co-
operation represent an emerging set of risks for the UK that climate change might exacerbate.  
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The impacts of climate change are highlighted in many scientific assessments as threat multipliers in 
already fragile states and regions through increasing stress on governance structures and resource 
availability, including water. Many regions currently or previously in conflict have low adaptive capacity 
to the future impacts of climate change, which amplifies and perpetuates conflict risks. The resources 
required to build long-term state stability and support sustainable development might be challenged 
by the potential shorter-term need to increase deployments for responding to humanitarian crises, for 
conflict intervention and/or peace-keeping (It5).  
Climate change will also impact on shared natural resources and, as a consequence, the relations 
between states, particularly international co-operation on shared water resources. The impacts of 
climate change could increase the risk of revising established principles of international law and 
governance. The capacity of current conflict resolution mechanisms may also be challenged. A 
breakdown of state structures could also lead to greater insecurity for trade and transport with 
implications for UK economic interests (It6). Risks to the UK would be through spill-over effects from 
increased political tension or, in extreme circumstances, conflict between states. 
International co-operation is also required to avoid the risks of transmission of emergent diseases to the 
UK and other threats to biosecurity (see Chapter 5). 
Box 7.1. Comparison with UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2012 
The first UK Climate Change Risk Assessment did not explicitly address international dimensions of 
climate change in its key findings, but was complemented by a separate report, ‘The International 
Dimensions of Climate Change’ (Foresight Report, 2011a). The Foresight report highlighted that the 
global food system is failing in both its current ability to deliver food security, and longer-term 
sustainability. It also highlighted multiple threats that are converging on the food system, including 
climate change, population growth and the availability of land, energy and water. In common with 
this chapter, the Foresight report highlighted the need for co-ordinated policies across different 
Government departments and policy arenas, as well as the need for greater international 
cooperation. Research and analysis since 2011 has highlighted the importance of systemic food 
system resilience, leading to the following key differences between the Foresight report and this 
updated risk assessment: 
• This chapter goes further than the Foresight report in its recognition of policy gaps.
• This chapter summarises the more recent evidence published since 2012, for example, the
results from the AVOID project on price volatility (West et al., 2015), recent studies from Lloyds
(Lloyds, 2015) and FCO (King et al., 2015) on ‘climate shocks’ and a PwC study on international
climate change impacts to the UK (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). It also includes a broader
discussion of conflict and migration risks.
• This chapter includes a comprehensive assessment of risks related to migration flows globally
that were highlighted in a separate Foresight study on Migration and Global Environmental
Change (Foresight, 2011b).
• This chapter assesses the uncertainty surrounding geopolitical risks that are exacerbated by
climate change, including the demand for humanitarian assistance, global conflict risks, and the
biosecurity dimensions of disease risks. These have previously been addressed by separate
government reviews, such as the Ashdown Review for DfID (Ashdown, 2011) on humanitarian
assistance.
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7.1 Context 
This chapter examines some of the risks and opportunities for the UK from the observed and 
projected impacts of climate change globally. The interactions between global climate and the 
UK arise through: 
• interactions between markets and economic interests;
• the flow of goods, services and people between the UK and the rest of the world, and
• the placement of the UK within the EU and international political system, including its
responsibilities and cultural ties to other parts of the world.
The assessment in this chapter summarises the potential risks and opportunities in three of the 
four international dimensions that represent the UK’s principal landscape of risk: food systems, 
migration and displacement risks, and broader geopolitical dimensions. A fourth dimension is 
the risk to international, non-food supply chains. This is discussed in Chapter 6. 
In this assessment we identify transmission mechanisms that transfer these global risks into 
meaningful risks or opportunities for the UK (Figure 7.1). 
Figure 7.1. Interactions between food system, migration and geopolitical risks/opportunities 
for the UK  
Food export/import mix: UK land-
use change
Demand for humanitarian 
assistance in globally affected 
regions
Food price volatility
Health impacts, nutrition and 
food safety (vulnerable groups)
Changing demand for labour in 
food system and inward 
migration
Demand for interventions, 
geopolitical instability and 
conflict
Displacement of vulnerable 
populations from weather 
extremes (It4)
Disruption to supply chains (It1) 
Disruption to agricultural 
production (It1)
Violent conflict over resource 
scarcity (It5)
Global food production (It3)
Food safety (It2)
Increased animal and plant 
disease
Increased risk of human disease
Unstable governance and 
geopolitical instability (It6)
Short-term shocks Long-term impactsImpacts to the UK
Economic attractiveness and 
viability of areas and settlements 
causing migration (It4)
Long-term investments, impacts 
on insurance
Section 7.2 Section 7.3 Section 7.4 Chapter 6
Global water availability
Chapter 5Box 7.2
Source: CCRA authors. 
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The dimensions of international risk and opportunity are discussed in the central sections of this 
chapter: 7.2 for food systems, 7.3 for migration and 7.4 for other geopolitical risks/opportunities. 
In each of these sections we consider: 
I. Current policy frameworks, in order to understand the current way that risks or 
opportunities may be managed. 
II. Current risks and opportunities, describing current international climate and non-climate
drivers, global impacts and the transmission mechanisms to the UK.
III. Future risks and opportunities, through analysing future dimensions. While there is a
significant evidence base in each of these areas, there is also significant uncertainty due to
compounding factors and long chains of cause and effect between climate change and the
resulting environmental, social and political outcomes. The timing, and in many cases
precise nature, of the impacts identified are often difficult to determine. There is a range of
interconnected endogenous and exogenous factors that act across borders to determine
outcomes. However, this does not prevent robust identification of key risks, some of which
are already significant in magnitude. All other things being equal, the greater the extent of
climate change, the sooner the risks manifest and the greater their magnitude (King et al.,
2015). As such, whether or not these risks become reality is not contingent on specific
climate scenarios.
IV. Adaptation shortfalls that prevent these risks from being managed, as a result of current
policies being absent or insufficient, or markets and actors failing to achieve autonomous
adaptation.
The evidence presented in this chapter has been used to determine the urgency of further 
action for the next round of national adaptation plans and programmes (see Synthesis Report 
appendix). 
Water security in other countries is not considered to be a separate international risk as 
international water security issues do not affect the UK directly, but operate through other risks 
(Box 7.2). 
Box 7.2. Global water security and risks to the UK 
Climate change impacts on global water security 
Water security is made up of diverse elements such as appropriate water availability to sustain human 
needs; sustainability of water availability and supply; and absence of human vulnerability to hydro-
meteorological hazards (Cook and Bakker, 2012). Climate change will have far reaching consequences 
across all of these elements. Direct impacts include the influence that climate change has on the 
hydrological cycle and water resources. Shifts in water flows in major trans-boundary river basins 
threaten the stability and availability of water supplies. Changing patterns of extremes will affect flood 
risk to individuals and communities with consequences for wellbeing. Other climate change impacts 
on water security include the redistribution of agricultural potential, affecting global food production 
and trade; conflicting demands for water between rural agricultural and urban areas; and rivalry 
between countries for shared water resources. 
Globally, changes in the hydrological cycle will alter water availability for irrigation, something that is 
not accounted for in many crop yield assessments. For a global warming of 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, global hydrological ensemble models show 10 - 30% reductions in mean streamflow across 
western and southern Brazil, parts of the south and south-east of the United States, and much of 
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Box 7.2. Global water security and risks to the UK 
western Europe (Schewe et al., 2014). All of these regions export food to the UK. However, most 
hydrological models do not incorporate the effect that increased CO2 has on water-use efficiency, 
which can result in increased runoff and irrigation water availability. For example, Elliott and 
colleagues (2014) found that, in currently irrigated areas, the need for irrigation could fall by 8 – 15% 
due to the increase in water-use efficiency associated with rising ambient CO2. However, this gain from 
ambient CO2 would be offset by changes in both water supply and demand globally. The same study 
has concluded that overall, the global impacts of climate change on streamflow could significantly 
impact the supply of irrigation water. Limited freshwater availability in heavily irrigated regions could 
mean that 20 – 60 million hectares of previously irrigated cropland would no longer be irrigated (Elliott 
et al., 2014). This corresponds to about 6 - 20% of the world’s irrigated area in 2006.1 The potential 
global limit on viable agricultural area could be offset by increases in specific areas brought under 
irrigation (e.g. Europe and parts of the US), but only with substantial investments in infrastructure and 
potential trade-offs with other water uses (for example, for the environment). 
Hotspots of current and future water insecurity are identified in all world regions. The impacts of 
climate change on transboundary rivers draining the Himalayan region, for example, have implications 
for large populations who are dependent on irrigation for agricultural livelihoods and employment. 
Evidence suggests that the Brahmaputra river basin (crossing China, Bangladesh and India) and Indus 
river basin (crossing Bangladesh, Pakistan and China) are the most likely to experience reductions in 
streamflow. Projections for the 2050s show that changes will also have substantial consequences for 
food security (Immerzeel et al., 2011). The crucial determinants will be how the Asian monsoon system 
evolves in a changing climate (Turner and Anamalai, 2012), and the degree of effective management of 
increasing competition for water as regional demand rises rapidly in the food, energy and water 
sectors (Godfray et al., 2010). Changes in demand for water at the regional scale, and changes in land 
and water management, could have a profound impact on availability. Global groundwater depletion 
more than doubled between 1960 and 2000, equalling about 40% of the global yearly groundwater 
abstraction (Wada et al., 2000). 
Impacts in the UK 
The consequences of international water security issues are not direct, as water directly consumed, 
processed and used in the UK comes almost exclusively from domestic water sources (see Chapter 4). 
However, the UK uses water resources from around the globe in part via imported food (It1), which 
itself makes up half the food retailed in the UK. Internationally sourced virtual, or embedded, water 
resources make up at least half the agricultural water footprint of the UK (GFS, 2015b). Longer-term 
climate change affecting the water cycle could impact on global food production (It3). Embedded 
water is also, in effect, imported via goods and services that are produced using hydroelectric energy 
(see Chapter 6). 
There is potential for disputes over water between states sharing the world’s 276 transboundary river 
basins, if rates of climate change in the future exceed the capacity to adapt to the change (Milman et 
al., 2013; Wolf, 2009). Rates of change are particularly important in relation to the risk of conflict (De 
Stefano et al., 2012). Historically, disputes over water alone have not directly led to violent conflict 
(Wolf, 1998), although, in areas with pre-existing political tensions or high water scarcity relative to 
demand, reductions in water availability could escalate conflict potential (It5). For example, in a 2°C 
warming scenario, global hydrological ensemble models show reductions in streamflow of 10 to 50% 
across North Africa, the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Schewe et al., 2014a). All of these areas 
1  http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/newsroom/docs/en-solaw-facts_1.pdf 
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Box 7.2. Global water security and risks to the UK 
already experience relatively low per capita water availability, rising consumption and in some cases 
ongoing political tensions. Plans throughout the world to deal with increased climate variability and 
changes in overall water resource availability are presently focused on expanding water storage 
infrastructure like dams on major rivers. Such infrastructure development has potentially negative 
consequences in downstream areas, including other countries.  
There are a number of international treaties and arbitration institutions for some major transboundary 
basins that have been somewhat effective to date in managing relations between countries (Wolf, 
2009; Milman et al., 2013). Yet modelled and projected climatic change and planned infrastructure 
developments have the potential to destabilise current co-operation (It6, Section 7.4).  
Source: CCRA authors. 
7.2 Dimension 1: Food systems 
Climate change could undermine the resilience of the UK food system by affecting affordability, 
markets, trade and safety. This section summarises the current evidence on risks to the UK food 
system from international climate change. 
The concept of food security is important for understanding food systems. The Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) defines food security as being ‘when all people, at all times, have 
physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food to meet their dietary needs 
and food preferences for an active and healthy life’ (FAO, 1996). The FAO identifies four pillars: 
availability, which is strongly related to production; access, which includes affordability; 
utilisation, which describes the safety and nutritional value of food; and stability, which 
distinguishes chronic food insecurity from shorter periods of difficulty. Food security, therefore, 
necessarily encompasses nutrition and safety (not just calories), stability of prices and social 
protection for the poor. 
While the term ‘food insecurity’ is often reserved for instances where access to food is a major 
challenge, the definition above makes it clear that it can apply in a range of other contexts. Food 
availability, affordability, safety and trade are all relevant aspects of food security for the UK. In 
order to avoid misconceptions, the term ‘food systems’ is often used in this chapter where the 
term ‘food security’ might equally be applied. This choice of wording emphasises that the key 
issue surrounding food in the UK is not systemic food insecurity, but rather the need for systemic 
resilience to international vulnerabilities in the food system (Centeno et al., 2015). 
As summarised in Figure 7.2, climate impacts that can potentially undermine the resilience of 
the UK food system include extreme weather-related impacts on international production and 
supply chains (It1); impacts to food safety (It2); and long-term climate change impacts on global 
food production and trade routes (It3, It7). These factors are also influenced by other 
international stressors discussed in this chapter, particularly violent conflict and state fragility 
(It4). They manifest as UK risks mainly through price spikes, which affect availability and 
affordability; trade, including balance between imports, exports and domestic production; and 
health impacts, including both nutrition and food safety. These impacts are interconnected. 
Chapter 7   –   International dimensions              10
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Evidence Report 
Figure 7.2. Climate drivers of global food-related risks and impacts to the UK 
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Source: CCRA authors. 
These risks are driven by changes in both the average climate and extreme events, which lead to 
long-term trends in a number of metrics and weather-related shocks, respectively (Table 7.2). 
These changes will vary geographically and the precise patterns of change are uncertain, as are 
the societal responses to the changes. It is therefore not possible to predict changes in UK 
imports, exports or in sustainable practices. However, links between risks and the leverage 
points for reducing risk are known. 
Table 7.2. Food-related risks and associated climate drivers 
Weather-related events Long-term climate changes 
Production shocks 
and changes 
Production shocks Global changes in food production 
Increased/decreased exports from the UK 
Increased/decreased sustainability of agriculture globally and in the UK 
Disruption to 
supply chains 
Impacts on infrastructure such as port 
closures, flooding of storage facilities etc. 
Food safety 
New trade routes 
Changing food 
composition 
Food safety, nutrition 
Source: CCRA authors. 
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It1: Risks to the UK food system from weather-related shocks to international food production 
and trade  
As an economically developed nation, the UK population is unlikely to suffer a prolonged lack of 
access to sufficient food now or in the future as a consequence of climate change. However in 
2012/13, the Trussell Trust reported that 350,000 people accessed food aid in the UK. Cooper 
and Dumpleton (2013) estimate that the annual number of people accessing food aid may be 
over 0.5 million people and at least 4 million people do not have access to a healthy diet2 
(Cooper and Dumpleton, 2013). For these people, lack of access to nutritious food because of 
unaffordability can prevent them from achieving balanced diet. 
The risk to people from decreased food affordability has been evident in the UK during recent 
climate-related food price spikes. For example, due to a number of events in 2007/08 there were 
marked shifts in prices and a subsequent reduction in the purchasing of nutritious foods such as 
fresh fruit and vegetables, especially in the lowest income deciles (Defra, 2012a). The risks to the 
UK from reduced affordability of food are mediated through international availability and supply 
chains which are at risk from climate change (Risks It1 and It3). These risks are detailed in Section 
7.2.2, with further information on food price spikes described in Annex A7.2. 
Current measures to manage the risk of price spikes in the UK include trade agreements and 
monitoring of price spikes. The Government does not actively intervene to manage price 
fluctuations. However, markets may not be able to function well under stress from increased 
frequency and scale of extreme events, and gradual long term climate changes. There is a 
growing awareness of this issue in the food retail sector. There is now significant activity 
underway to identify risks of climate-related interruptions to supply chains, but the risk is 
projected to increase over the coming decades (Section 7.2.2). 
It2 Imported food safety risks due to food-borne disease, contamination and toxicity 
In contrast to availability and affordability, food safety issues could affect all income groups. The 
risk is driven by changes in food composition through diseases affecting food products (e.g. 
avian flu) or microbial contamination and toxicity. Changes in the availability of agricultural 
products will also likely lead to substitution of ingredients (see Section 7.2.3). Given the volume 
of food imports, quality assurance schemes of food importers are a key element in managing 
food safety. The existing risks to UK food safety from imports are of relatively low likelihood, 
although with high potential impact. In the longer term, new food safety risks are likely to 
emerge as a result of the climate-induced geographical spread of diseases and microbial toxins. 
The complex nature of international food supply chains, coupled with the growing nature of this 
risk (Section 7.2.3) necessitates monitoring of both UK food imports over time and the potential 
for emerging threats beyond UK borders. 
It3, It7 Risks and opportunities derived from long-term changes in global food production 
patterns 
A longer-term threat to UK food availability comes from declining yields and the potential for 
geographical changes in food production (It3, Section 7.2.3). Coupled with increases in demand 
2  A ‘healthy diet’ is defined as containing specific caloric and nutritional contents, as well as sources of these 
calories (e.g. proportions of fruits, vegetables, legumes etc.). See 
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs394/en/  
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driven by population growth and changing diets, including increased consumption of meat and 
processed food, agricultural expansion worldwide is likely to be required if future demand is to 
be met. This in turn would amplify competition for resources and increase greenhouse gas 
emissions. 
If climate change makes UK agriculture comparatively more competitive, the market may 
respond by intensifying agriculture domestically. This has the potential for environmentally 
unsustainable agri-business practices and longer-term depletion of the resource base, especially 
natural assets like soils and their associated ecosystem services. In fact, current downward trends 
in the condition of these natural assets may limit the capacity to produce more food in the UK in 
the future (see Chapter 3). This could lead to greater dependence on imports.  
Predicting shifts in food production is difficult because the extent to which future extreme 
events could hamper domestic and international production is unclear ; and there is no 
quantification of the climate and environmental thresholds (commonly referred as “tipping 
points”) that could have irreversible impacts for the UK and international natural assets (Chapter 
3) .Thus it is currently impossible to predict what the global changes in food production will be,
or what their impacts on the UK will be. Increased competitiveness and increased dependency 
on imports are both possible, and impacts may be different for different food groups. 
Climate change could give rise to non-food agricultural export opportunities for the UK. The UK 
is in a good position to support adaptation and agriculture overseas. The principal business 
opportunities in support of global agriculture include agrichemicals, biotech and agri-
informatics to be used in, for example, precision farming, climate risk management tools and 
expert advice, and transport (see also Chapter 6). The UK is also well-positioned to make 
contributions to overseas adaptation through knowhow, for example, in water resources, 
healthcare and infrastructure. Some opportunities also arise for business, such as those from 
Arctic ice melt (see Box 7.3, It7). 
There is a role for UK businesses to increase the sustainability of their operations regardless of 
climate change. As UK business gives increasing attention to climate change, it is likely to find 
significant opportunities for improving food systems, reducing costs and responding to 
demands from consumers more aware of climate change and other sustainability issues related 
to food. A growing number of food companies are already aware of the clear business case for 
more sustainable practices throughout their supply chains. Demand-side measures to guide 
nutrition and health can also lead to greater sustainability as healthier eating makes more 
effective use of available food (e.g. reducing consumption of meat, especially in processed meat 
diets). The increase in sustainable practices, including reducing waste throughout the supply 
chain, will also support longer-term food system stability and increase resilience to climate 
change. 
7.2.1 UK food system resilience and food safety policy 
As the definition of food security includes access to food for a healthy life, the resilience of the 
UK food system covers policy domains across a range of UK government departments including: 
• the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) for food supply;
• the Department of Health (DoH) for public health, diet and nutrition, and food-related
illnesses such as diabetes;
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• the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and Food Standards Scotland (FSS) for food safety and
consumers’ interests in relation to food;
• the Treasury, Defra and Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS) for international
dimensions and interests in trade;
• the Department for International Development (DfID) for food security in other countries,
and
• the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) for
international dialogue and national security.
The main policies related to UK food system resilience are summarised in Annex 7.A. 
Although Defra’s new food security strategy has not yet been published (as of 17 June 2016), the 
Government response (Defra, 2015a) to the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (EFRA) 
committee report on food security (EFRA, 2014) states that the objectives of the Government 
food security strategy are: 
1. UK food security built on access to a wide variety of markets including domestic, the EU and
an open, rules-based world trading system.
2. The importance of sustainable intensification of UK agriculture.
3. Making the most of our productivity potential through the agri-tech strategy (Defra, 2015a).
Food production and manufacturing are devolved policy areas in relation to domestic 
production, while overarching goals on UK-wide food security in the devolved administrations 
are in line with Defra objectives or not stated. National food strategies are mostly directed at 
domestic production. For example, ‘Food for Wales, Food from Wales 2010/2020’ (WAG, 2010) is 
a ten year policy statement that sets out the policy direction outlined in ‘Towards Sustainable 
Growth: An Action Plan for the Food and Drink Industry 2014 – 2020’. The strategy recognises 
the integration of the Welsh food system into UK and European systems and the influence on it 
from the wider global context. The Northern Ireland strategy (Agri-Food Strategy Board, 2013) 
adopts similar objectives to those delineated by the Government, but includes an explicit 
recognition of the role of Government by calling for greater Government intervention in areas 
such as the identification of best practice for efficient production in relevant sectors and the 
development of strategic regional land management policies to determine the most productive 
use of land. Both the Northern Ireland and Wales strategies recognise the potential for linking 
food security and health. 
The Food Standards Agency (FSA) is responsible for developing and implementing food safety 
policy in England, Wales and Northern Ireland and is the UK Competent Authority with respect 
to EU law on food safety. Food Standards Scotland is responsible for food safety (and nutrition) 
policy in Scotland. Policies are similar around the UK as they reflect EU frameworks. The 
international dimensions of risk for food safety are mostly due to contamination of food by 
chemicals or pathogens, or substitution of expensive food for cheaper alternatives (such as 
horse for beef). This latter risk is often associated with differential price rises, which may reflect 
production shocks. The main legislation in England covering the import of food containing 
animal products is the Trade in Animals and Related Products (TARP) Regulations 2011. Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland have their own very similar regulations. The regulations establish 
controls on food imported from countries outside the EU. The EU Official Controls Regulation 
882/2004 and The Official Feed and Food Controls (England) Regulations 2009 (HM Government, 
2009) and the equivalent in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland are the main legal instruments 
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governing the control of food not-of-animal-origin entering the UK from non-EU countries. Food 
imported from non-EU countries must also comply with the requirements of the Food Hygiene 
Regulations (EC Regulation 852/2004). The duties of port health authorities are key to the 
international dimensions of food risk. These duties include ensuring that only products that are 
safe to eat enter the food chain; safeguarding of animal and public health; and checking 
compliance with EU rules and international trading standards.3 
7.2.2 Current risks and opportunities for food systems 
Risks to the UK food system from weather-related shocks to international food production 
(It1) 
The global food system has multiple interdependencies: 
• For major agricultural commodities, a significant proportion of total global production is
now traded internationally (Liapis, 2012). This has positive impacts, including on
diversification, trade and world commodity prices, which have been low in real terms prior to
the price shocks of the late 2000s.4 At the same time, the increasing global
interconnectedness of global food systems via trade increases the susceptibility of food
supplies to production or price shocks, or policy shocks such as multiple trade embargoes
(ibid; Foti et al., 2013).
• Imports constitute the majority of domestic consumption for approximately 85% of
countries, with significant interdependence in their food supply (Ercsey-Ravasz et al., 2012;
Fader et al., 2013). In 2014, 22 countries (included UK) accounted for 90% of the supply of all
UK food, valued on a raw food basis (Defra, 2015b).
• For example, around half the farm-gate value of unprocessed food in the UK is imported. The
UK’s principal trading partner is the EU (27%) (Defra, 2015b), but imports arrive from 168
countries in total (Defra, 2012a). Meat, dairy and eggs are mainly supplied domestically (84%
and 86% respectively) (Defra, 2015b).
• Some key food staples come from a small number of specialised countries. For example, 34%
of processed and unprocessed cereals are imported from 11 countries (Defra, 2015a). For
maize, just over 27% of the UK import comes from China, 17% from France, 15% from the US
and 12% from Brazil. China is the main producer of rice for the UK (about 54%), followed by
India (12%) and Thailand (10%). Around 42% of UK soy comes from Brazil and 32% from
Argentina (West et al., 2015). This concentration in production is one of the key
vulnerabilities in food markets (Abson et al., 2013).
In recent decades, there has been about a 1% chance per year of losing approximately 10% of 
global calories produced around the world (GFS, 2015a). Globally, climate events have caused 
major production losses in the past: 8 of the 20 years from 1993 to 2012 showed a globally 
significant major production loss associated with one or more climate extremes (Porter et al., 
2014). For example, back-to-back droughts in Australia in 2006 and 2007 reduced grain exports 
by an average of 9.2 million tons per year (about half of the annual production) compared to 
2005, and poor crops in the EU and Ukraine led to export reductions of 10 million tons in 2007 
3  https://www.gov.uk/port-health-authorities-monitoring-of-food-imports 
4  http://www.fao.org/docrep/014/i2330e/i2330e03.pdf 
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(Mitchell, 2008). A number of the production shocks during 1993 – 2012 suggest some 
underlying climate trends (Porter et al., 2014). While predictions of the frequency of extreme 
events are inherently difficult to make, the trend towards increasing occurrences, and the 
attribution of that trend to anthropogenic climate change, is clear (e.g. Hansen et al., 2012). The 
number of extreme events (heatwaves, droughts, flooding and other climate-related hazards) 
has increased over the last decade (WMO, 2013). Otto et al. (2012) examined the Russian heat 
wave of 2010, finding that in the 1960s, such an event would be expected approximately every 
99 years (i.e. an annual risk of 1%), whereas in the first decade of the 21st century this would be 
expected to occur every 33 years (i.e. an annual risk of 3%). 
Since the 1990s, climate extremes in major growing regions have often been followed by spikes 
in global food prices, leading the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (Porter et 
al., 2014) to conclude that prices may have become more sensitive to weather-related food 
shortfalls in recent years. The relationship between harvest failures and food prices is a complex 
one, as it is also influenced by market mechanisms, export taxes or bans and increasing demand 
for biofuel (Piesse and Thirtle, 2009; Hernandez et al., 2010; Porter et al., 2014; see also Chapter 
3). Despite this complexity, the impact of extreme climate events can clearly be amplified by 
markets and associated factors (GFS, 2015a), such that a significant impact on world prices can 
result from relatively modest shortfalls in global production (Wright, 2011). 
The IPCC assessment (Porter et al., 2014) concluded that in this new era where food prices and 
oil prices are more closely linked, market and policy responses to production shocks can lead to 
price volatility. The Global Food Security report (GFS, 2015a) went further, showing that the 
vulnerability of the global food system to production shocks caused by extreme weather is 
already significant and is growing. The report also identified a risk of multiple simultaneous 
production disruptions in key producing areas (breadbaskets), based on a plausible combination 
of historical production shocks. Analysis of the implications of such multiple breadbasket failures 
demonstrated that widespread political, social and economic disruption across the globe is 
likely, including significant impacts on the UK. Multiple interacting factors lead to food price 
spikes (Annex 7.C), so that the role of climate risk is difficult to quantify.  
The characteristics of global agricultural trade are such that it can amplify the underlying climate 
risk. There are three aspects to this: 
• First, countries can direct domestic production to domestic consumption, and this has a
tendency to make world markets relatively volatile because, if shocks occur, exports are more
likely to be affected than imports.
• Second, agricultural production of key staples tends to be highly concentrated. The top five
wheat exporters accounted for around 80% of total world wheat exports in 1995 with the US
accounting for 32%, Canada 17%, France 16%, Australia 8% and Argentina 7% (Annex 7.B).
The import side is also highly concentrated.
• Third, the structure of world agricultural markets has changed in recent years, for example
Russia and the Ukraine have increased their share of world exports. Some of these changes
have made the market more vulnerable to price spikes (see Annex 7.C).
Climate impacts on global food production are thus likely be transmitted to the UK through food 
prices, especially because UK food prices are particularly sensitive to events on world food 
markets (Lloyd et al., 2015). Volatility in UK food inflation has far exceeded that of non-food 
inflation over the last 15 years. The experience of food inflation in the UK is shown in Figure 7.3 
with recent spikes coinciding with the decline in global agricultural exports as noted above. The 
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exposure to food inflation pressures in the UK tends to be higher than that of many EU 
countries, reflecting the open nature of the UK economy (ibid). This is shown in Figure 7.4, which 
highlights the average experience of food inflation relative to the average of non-food inflation 
over the 2000 – 2014 period in other EU countries. As is evident from the figure, with the 
exception of Sweden, the UK’s relative experience of food inflation has been higher than that of 
other EU Member States. These data underpin the exposure the UK faces with respect to 
developments on world markets.  
Price spikes have a direct impact on low income households. Increased food prices diminishes 
the disposable income to spend on other basic goods, such as clothing and education (FAO, 
2011; Watkiss et al., 2016); and on food, for the lower income bands (Defra, 2012a).  
Crop price spikes also affect animal feed (CERF, 2015). For example, the 2011/2012 US drought 
contributed to an increase in the price of soya, causing up to an estimated 25% of UK pig 
farmers leaving the industry by end of 2012 (Benton, 2012). The losses from the 2012 drought 
have an estimated 20% annual chance of occurrence5.  
Figure 7.3. UK food and non-food inflation (May 2001 – April 2016) 
Source: Data up to 2014 are from Lloyd et al. (2015). Date after 2015 are from ONS Consumer Price Index.6 
5  http://www.air-worldwide.com/Publications/AIR-Currents/2013/The-2012-U-S--Drought-and-What-to-Expect-
from-the-2013-Crop-Season/ 
6     http://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices/bulletins/consumerpriceinflation/apr2016 
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 Figure 7.4. Average ratio of food inflation and non-food inflation across EU Member States, 2000 – 
2014 
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Considering the range of sources from which the UK imports food, two observations may be 
made. First, the large range of food sources, and the interconnected nature of markets, means 
there are few parts of the globe where a production shock would fail to have an impact on the 
UK. Second, production shocks in the EU are likely to have a particularly significant effect in the 
UK. For example, in 2003, due to a large-scale heat wave, French maize production fell by nearly 
one-third (Parry et al., 2007). There were broader impacts of this event in Europe which, in the 
absence of trade, would have significantly affected food security (Battisti and Naylor, 2009). 
In addition to market responses, the impact of extreme climate events on food systems also 
depends on how governments respond. Production shortfalls are a typical feature of world 
agricultural markets but trade helps buffer production shortfalls when they arise in specific 
countries, either by diverting purchases to other sources, or by cutting net imports. Research 
related to the experience of the commodity crises in 2007 – 2008 and 2011 showed that one of 
the main contributory factors to the price spikes was how governments responded. In order to 
soften the domestic impact arising from price rises on world markets, governments used trade 
policy instruments such as banning exports in order to promote domestic food security. This had 
the effect of fuelling larger price spikes on world markets. Accounting for potential unilateral 
government responses is therefore crucial in assessing this risk (Martin and Anderson, 2012). 
The UK is now more dependent on food imports than it was in the 1980s (see Annex 7.B), thus 
linking domestic food supplies to production shocks among the UK’s leading trading partners. 
How the UK’s trading partners respond to events on world markets is therefore also important. It 
is necessary to gauge how leading trading partners, such as Russia and the Ukraine, and 
Argentina and Brazil, will respond to climate events and price spikes and whether they will 
always abide by the rules of international trade in such circumstances. In this context, the UK’s 
role in future developments in the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and, by extension, 
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developments in the WTO, are important to create the appropriate policy structure to minimise 
the impact of price shocks and underlying price increases from climate change. 
In summary, how production shocks specifically impact on the UK will depend on how they 
interact with other factors, which have the potential to offset or amplify risk (Annex 7.C). For 
example, protectionist responses from governments that seek to address domestic issues in the 
face of production declines may increase price volatility. The UK government has significant 
influence over these exogenous factors, for example, through anticipating and managing 
protectionist responses, which highlights the importance of coherent policy making in this area. 
If markets are working well, climate-induced volatility is likely to be dampened (Puma et al., 
2015). But markets alone cannot be relied upon to manage price spikes and volatility, especially 
as food production has become increasingly susceptible to instability in recent decades (Suweis 
et al., 2015). 
Risks to the UK food system from disrupted international supply chains (It1) 
Transport for the majority of agri-food commodities is by sea, since the commodities are 
relatively low value by density. Globally, 77% of the total value of raw agricultural products is 
transported by sea, 17% by road, 3% by air and 3% by rail (Cristea et al., 2013). For processed 
food, it is 56% by sea, 39% by road, 3% by air and 2% by rail. The impacts of severe storms and 
associated surges on loading and unloading at ports have been identified as a global issue 
affecting trade routes. Becker et al. (2013); Bailey and Wellesley (in press); and Centeno et al. 
(2015) highlight that much international trade is channelled through a small number of 
‘chokepoints’ which makes trade highly vulnerable to disruption caused by weather. These 
include the Panama and Suez canals, which handle around 5% and 15% of global sea-borne 
trade, and 11% and 26% of global cereals trade, respectively. 
Food trade hubs are vulnerable to both the direct impact of extreme weather and indirect 
impacts via conflict or political instability (risks It5 and It6). If a major hub were to be affected, 
direct and indirect impacts would combine, producing an increased risk of price spikes (cf. risk 
It1). For example, sustained and major disruptions to exports from the US or the Black Sea could 
likely expose UK prices to significant fluctuation, due to the importance of the trade in these 
regions (Annex 7.C). 
In addition to the effect on prices, disruption to international supply chains could affect access 
to food in the UK. Some specific current and future risks to UK imports of rice and soybean posed 
by extreme weather were highlighted by Bailey and Wellesley (in press) and are presented in 
Annex 7.D. There are also numerous potential issues for UK supply chains for specific highly 
traded foods such as fruit and vegetables. For example, the area of orchard land in the UK fell by 
nearly a third between 2001 and 2007, and more than two-thirds of the apples consumed in the 
UK are now imported7. 
More than 90% of UK food imports arrive by sea (Defra, 2012b). A recent study (Achuthan et al., 
2015) reviewed the risks associated with storm surges in the east coast ports (Dover to Tyne), 
which account for 57% of food imports. The report identified a major tidal surge on the east 
coast as a major potential risk to import capacity. Road and rail also play important roles in food 
transport (from farm to factory to port in the exporting country). While the distributed nature of 
7  http://www.ifr.ac.uk/science-society/spotlight/apples/ 
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road and rail provide some resilience to trade-flows, there remain considerable climate risks. For 
example, within the EU (which is the UK’s principal trading partner), the EU FP7 WEATHER8 
project estimated that the annual costs of extreme weather on land transport logistics (across all 
sectors) was €2.5bn. As with maritime infrastructure, there are key pinchpoints where disruption 
can have major impacts (e.g. routes towards ports, major arterial highways). One of the major 
constraints on Brazilian soy exports is the transport infrastructure inland of its ports9. 
Food stock levels in the UK have decreased since the new millennium (Annex 7.C), which 
decreases resilience to supply chain disruption. Food safety (risk It2) and associated consumer 
mistrust could also be an issue. Finally, there would also be a loss of revenue directly resulting 
from the disrupted trade. 
Imported food safety risks (It2) 
Food quality and safety can be directly affected by disease and toxicity. Substitution of one 
ingredient for another can also generate quality and safety issues. The National Food Crime Unit 
has published the first Annual Food Crime National Assessment on behalf of the FSA and Food 
Standards Scotland10 which identified the UK food system as vulnerable to food crime, with 
climate-related disruptions playing an increasingly important role. Imported goods vulnerable 
to food crime include specialised products such as honey and olive oil. Climate change acts as a 
multiplier on existing quality and safety issues mediated by the supply chain. There are many 
risks to food safety associated with extreme events:  
• Environmental contamination associated with increased flooding, pesticide use, and
transmission of disease and toxicity through food (Tirado et al., 2010).
• Interruptions to logistics (Risk It1) can have direct impacts on the availability of food and
indirect ones, such as creating opportunities for accidental or deliberate substitution of one
ingredient for another, which could have safety risks associated if substitution involves food
fraud (Busta and Kennedy, 2011).
Substitution of ingredients may be transparent and have little impact; or it may act as an
incentive for food adulteration and have significant risks for food safety or quality.
Substitution is more likely for ingredients with limited supply and strong demand. For
example, the two main producers of cocoa are Ghana and Côte d'Ivoire, which together
produce 53% of the world's cocoa (Laderach et al., 2013). This can lead to substitution of
cocoa with palm oil (section 7.2.3).
• Substitutions may reduce the safety and quality of the final product. The substitution of
horse meat for beef that came to light in the UK in 2013 highlights the potential for
widespread substitution that may go unnoticed by manufacturers, retailers and the
authorities. Another example is the substitution of peanut for cumin, with clear safety
implications given the allergenicity of peanuts. For example, India provides around 75% of
global cumin production. Production of cumin in Gujarat, the major growing region, was
40% lower in 2014 than in 2013. This reduction was partly due to sowing delays caused by
high temperatures and partly due to the low market price in 2014, following a bumper
8  http://www.weather-project.eu/weather/index.php 
9  http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-latin-america-22188250 
10  https://wwwcumi.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/fsa-food-crime-assessment-2016.pdf 
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harvest. Although it is difficult to find a causal relationship between this episode and the 
recall of cumin in the US,11 it exemplifies the potential issue. 
• Poor storage conditions can expose stored products to microbial contamination. This may be
exacerbated by extreme heat or humidity and give rise to significant potential health
impacts. For example, studies show that incidence of human Salmonella poisoning in Canada
and Australia increase with temperature. In Europe, increases of 5 – 10% for each degree
temperature rise above 5ºC have been observed, although in the UK total incidence is
declining due to better management techniques (see Chapter 5). In south Australia, a
doubling of associated mortality rates by 2050 has been predicted (Tirado et al., 2010).
• Some fungi that grow on many crops (e.g. maize, wheat) produce mycotoxins, which can
have acute and fatal consequences. Temperature and water stress during crop growth tend
to increase mycotoxin incidence (Miraglia et al., 2009). Measuring contamination levels in the
food chain is not straightforward. Even relatively small doses with no clinical symptoms are
associated with carcinogenic, immunosuppressive and neurotoxic activity (Tirado et al.,
2010). Roughly a quarter of the global annual maize crop is contaminated (Vermeulen et al.,
2012) and the toxins have been detected in cereal-based foods such as bread, noodles,
breakfast cereal and baby food (Chakraborty and Newton, 2011).
• Weather can interrupt the supply chains of goods requiring temperature controlled
environments through contamination or spoilage due to goods being exposed to higher
temperatures. The largest product recall in US history (3,192 products across more than 200
companies) came from Salmonella-contaminated peanuts entering the food chain (Johnson,
2014). While this outbreak was unrelated to weather, it highlights the potential impact of
contaminated food within the food chain.
There is some evidence of engagement in adaptation in response to climate-induced food safety 
issues in the fresh produce sector, such as water control, pesticide management, personal 
hygiene requirements and (cold) storage control. However, these responses vary among 
different countries (Kirezieva et al., 2015). 
Opportunity: UK expertise and interests in adapting global agriculture to climate change 
The above discussion is largely in the context of food imports to the UK. There is also the 
potential for the UK to export a range of products and services aimed at supporting production 
overseas. Agrichemicals, biotech and agri-informatics can be used to develop climate-smart 
technologies (Emberson et al., 2015), as well as drought, heat, pest and disease resistance in 
crops (Baulcombe et al., 2014). UK business can contribute to the infrastructure and logistics of 
transport of food abroad (c.f. risk It1), which in turn supports our own food security. Research 
institutes such as the UK Meteorological Office, commercial weather (agrometeorological and 
flood) forecasting services, the risk management sector and the emerging expertise in climate 
resilience services may be able to apply their world-leading expertise to supporting climate risk 
management in international settings. 
The potential for exporting risk management tools goes beyond agriculture to include, for 
example, water resources, healthcare and infrastructure (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). UK 
11
http://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/SafetyAlertsAdvisories/ucm434274.htm#recalledproducts 
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consultancies, particularly in environmental and engineering, and financial and business 
services, possess strong expertise and global reach. They are therefore well-placed to contribute 
to adaptation processes across all sectors (GHK, 2010). This could include commercial services 
and roles in providing technical assistance to developing countries through international 
climate finance. It is argued that such companies have skills in many of the key elements 
required for adaptation, such as linking risk assessments with impact modelling, mapping and 
scenario building (GHK, 2010). UK consulting firms are already involved in developing activities 
to provide climate change information services to corporations and public bodies to help them 
understand climate change risks and to develop adaptation plans (Agrawala et al., 2011). The UK 
is thus in a good position to respond to increased international demand for insurance and risk-
based advisory services. There is also the potential to respond to increased demand for 
adaptation guidance and technical support through United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) mechanisms, International Climate Funds and other international 
clients. 
This opportunity is discussed in Chapter 6 of this report and therefore not considered further 
here. 
Managing food system risks can improve public health and lead to more sustainable business 
practices 
Many of the actions to improve food system resilience could be tailored to create more 
sustainable approaches with better health outcomes and should therefore be seen as an 
opportunity resulting from climate change adaptation. Improvements in food system stability 
can reduce the risk of climate impacts on prices or availability of food. For example: 
• Awareness of healthy eating promotes diets that improve the sustainability of the food
system by making more effective use of available food (Soussana, 2014) and by increasing
the ratio of vegetables to meat.
• Tackling pre- and post-market food waste, which varies globally between around 10 and
40%, would significantly increase the sustainability and resilience of the food system.
• Improved land use across the EU could reduce the need for net imports
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013; Soussana, 2014).
Improvements to food security overseas positively influence other international risks, including 
conflict and migration. Climate change provides a catalyst for action. While scenarios of 
potential issues around water, food and energy resources out to 2050 are often grounded on the 
growing population and associated increase in demand, alternative narratives suggest the 
potential for a future where food systems are more sustainable (Tomlinson, 2013). Private-sector 
buy-in for sustainability is key to capitalising on these and other opportunities.  
There are several local initiatives to encourage business to improve their knowledge of the food 
system (for example http://bristolfoodpolicycouncil.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/Who-
Feeds-Bristol-report.pdf). However, some businesses may lack the necessary information to link 
climate change for their supply chains, production and distribution networks and to the demand 
to their products.  
Government intervention in this context could include provision of information and decision 
making tools to increase awareness. One such tool is natural capital accounting which can show 
impacts and dependencies between natural capital and business over a long time period.  
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Improving relationships with the suppliers, through providing them with incentives such as 
long-term contracts, has been shown to be beneficial in helping to capitalise on opportunities 
for improved public health and food system stability. Agreements between producers and the 
supply chain to sell goods onto consumers that meet certain attributes (for example goods with 
high environmental, health or social credentials) are another such mechanism. There are also 
opportunities to link more sustainable business practices with development and agriculture 
(both in the UK and overseas) through the use of sustainability standards and certification (e.g. 
ISO, ecological footprints). 
Voluntary standards within a company can also be productive. For example, some major retailers 
have internal ‘sustainability standards’, which involve assessment of climate risk, resilience, 
carbon and water efficiency, and broader sustainability. Major retailers imposing internal 
standards on producers can have a global impact on the resilience and sustainability of 
production. 
There are likely to be significant trade-offs associated with each of these opportunities. If 
business is aware of the broader issues of climate and environment that will affect their future 
profitability, or can see that they gain popular support and market share through their actions 
on sustainability, they can drive mitigation and adaptation around the world. If businesses fail to 
see this, in spite of actions to increase awareness, voluntary initiatives, investment incentives 
etc., then stronger intervention that regulates or incentivises business behaviour (such as caps, 
trading, taxation on emissions or use of certain raw materials) becomes necessary. 
7.2.3 Future risks and opportunities in food systems 
This section discusses the future impacts on food systems arising from the risks mentioned in 
7.2.2. While quantitative evidence on future impacts is limited, there is more confidence in the 
expected ‘direction of travel’. 
Risks associated with production shocks, supply chains and food safety (risks It1 and It2) 
Increase in risks due to extreme events 
The incidence of extreme events is projected to increase globally (Field et al., 2012), causing an 
increase in the likelihood of supply chain and production shocks. The year-to-year variability of 
food production yields is projected to increase, due to extreme events (Challinor et al., 2014a). 
Existing risks of production shocks and supply chain disturbance are also projected to increase 
over the century with further warming. For example, the chance of losing 10% of the world’s 
calories in any given year is currently about 1%, but over the period 2011 – 2045 this risk is 
projected to increase by a factor of two or three (GFS, 2015a). 
Longer-term climate change will tend to exacerbate existing food quality and safety risks, via 
increased extremes, and introduce new risks due to changes in geographical spread. 
Food safety 
Food safety is likely to be impacted by climate change through the sensitivity of food-borne 
pathogens and their associated diseases to changes in temperature. 
In addition to the public health risks, mycotoxins disrupt international trade. For example, of all 
the food safety hazards, they triggered the highest number of notifications in the EU in 2006. 
Risks are projected to increase with climate change. For example, model projections show an 
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increase in risks of occurrence of Fusarium head blight in wheat in South America and in the UK. 
EU limits on toxin concentrations are projected to be exceeded by 2050 (Chakraborty and 
Newton, 2011). GMO has the potential to reduce mycotoxin incidence (Wu, 2006). 
As a result of climate change, livestock could experience outbreaks of severe diseases novel to 
that population. The lack of previous exposure implies no evolved genetic resistance, and 
therefore greater risk (Thornton et al., 2009). There is the potential for some livestock diseases to 
be communicable to humans (e.g. avian flu) suggesting that this issue is potentially broader 
than an issue of food safety. 
Food quality 
Climate change will affect the quality of numerous foods. There is evidence that the 
carbohydrate composition of food crops is systematically altered under elevated carbon dioxide, 
with various implications, including increased digestive problems (Damatta et al., 2010). The 
protein content of most crops decreases under elevated carbon dioxide levels, resulting in 
impaired quality (Taub et al., 2008). A reduction in mineral nutrient and protein concentration of 
wheat grain negatively impacts bread quality (Blumenthal et al., 1996; Fernando et al., 2012), and 
reduces the nutritional quality of the final food. Interactions with temperature can further 
reduce the protein content (Bai et al., 2005) and the subsequent quality of the bread. 
Substitution 
Substitution is affected by changes in climate suitability, with substitution becoming even more 
likely for ingredients with limited supply and strong demand. In the example of cocoa, as 
climatic suitability envelopes alter, some parts of Côte d'Ivoire will be unable to grow cocoa, 
while others will need new management techniques, and yet others may become more 
productive (Laderach et al., 2013). If these changes are not well managed then cocoa production 
may fall, and global prices rise. Substitution of cocoa butter with palm oil derivatives (Undurraga 
et al., 2001) may therefore become more likely. 
Changes in global food production patterns (It3) 
In tandem with population growth, climate change will place increased pressure on the food 
system over the coming decades (e.g. Poppy et al., 2014). Mean changes in crop suitability, water 
availability and prevalence of pests and diseases will alter global production patterns (Lane and 
Jarvis, 2007; Garrett et al., 2013; Elliott et al., 2014). New opportunities will exist, especially in 
temperate regions. For example, suitability for crop cultivation is likely to increase in the 
northern hemisphere(e.g. Canada, China and Russia, though this may be constrained by soil 
quality), while the southern hemisphere more regions with decreasing suitability, mostly in the 
tropics (Zabel et al., 2014). 
However, despite changes in the average conditions, long-term projections cannot be framed as 
simple linear trends. This is because long-term climate change can contain significant decadal 
variability (Hawkins et al., 2014). Relative changes in the means and variability of climate 
(extreme weather and its impacts: risk It1), as well as the compounding effect of non-climate 
factors, such as deforestation (Lawrence and Vandecar, 2015; It1), make it difficult to project 
exactly how a change in average conditions will affect agricultural productivity. 
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• West et al. (2015) assessed the impact of climate change on food commodity chains that are
crucial for UK food consumption (Figure 7.5).
Figure 7.5. Projected changes in agricultural production for key staple crops by the end of the century 
Source: West et al., 2015. 
Notes: Pegasus, GEPIC and LPJ-Guess are three Global Gridded Crop Models (GGCMs) modelling global national-
level yields. Pegasus and GEPIC are models without irrigation or CO2 fertilisation, generally projecting decreasing 
yields; LPJ-Guess is a GGCM model that includes CO2 fertilisation effects and full irrigation, generally projecting 
increasing yields (West et al., 2015, AVOID2 project). 
The large variation between the scenarios shown in figure 7.5 is due to the selection of climate 
scenarios and crop models focussing deliberately on the extremes of model behaviour.  There is 
considerable uncertainty and no consensus on the sign of the change in global production (or 
its annual variability) in the evidence presented in this report.   
In general, there is no single quantification of the risk posed by climate change to key growing 
regions worldwide. Additional risks due to ground level ozone, including contributions from 
transboundary NOx, are currently significant (Hollaway et al., 2012), and will grow if future 
emissions increase. 
The effect of changes in future prices is potentially high, although the contribution of climate 
change over other factors such as economic growth and demography is unclear. For example, 
wheat prices could rise by 54% by 2050 due to climate change and other non-climate drivers; 
but would rise by 23% with perfect mitigation to keep the climate change effect constant 
(Nelson et. al, 2009. For maize, world prices would increase by 100% by 2050 due to climate and 
non-climate drivers; but with mitigation, maize prices would rise by 32% (Nelson et. al, 2010). 
Schmidhuber and Tubiello (2007) suggest that socioeconomic factors will dominate climate 
change. Similarly Baldos and Hertel (2014) conclude that the impact of climate change is easily 
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dominated by other demand and supply drivers, income growth in the case of wheat and total 
factor productivity in the case of maize.  
The global geography of crop cultivation will also be impacted by changes in water availability 
(see Box 7.2). 
Crop production is not the only food source to be affected by climate and non-climate changes. 
Globally, at least 4.5 billion people source 15% or more of their intake of animal protein from fish 
(Bene et al., 2015). Overfishing is currently an issue globally and the potential for fish to 
contribute to global food security is dependent on sustainable fisheries management and the 
quantity of fish protein used for animal feeds (Merino et al., 2012). Climate change is impacting 
global fish stocks, especially in terms of the redistribution of species, which will challenge 
fisheries productivity in sensitive regions (Porter et al., 2014). Potential fish production could 
decrease by 30 – 60% in some areas of tropical shelf and upwelling seas, while pelagic predators 
are projected to increase by 28 – 89% in the higher latitude sea shelf (Blanchard et al., 2012). It is 
not clear whether this would impact the resilience of the UK food system, given the current 
modest contribution of fish to the UK diet (Defra, 2012a). The UK population consumes on 
average 2% of average daily calories from fish against, for example, 10% from meat and about 
11% from milk and dairy (Defra, 2011). Trends of fish consumption in the UK are also declining as 
fish is usually substituted with other food as prices rise (Defra, 2012a). Within the UK, the extent 
to which ocean acidification may impact marine ecosystems and production potential is 
uncertain and more research is needed (NE12, Chapter 3). 
Autonomous adaptation across the globe has some capacity to moderate the impacts of climate 
change on crops. Simple agronomic adaptation such as a change in planting date, increase in 
irrigation or change in crop variety can reduce, or even reverse negative impacts on yield. 
However, in the longer term, at the latest by 2050, more systemic changes are likely to be 
required (Vermeulen et al., 2013; Challinor et al., 2014b). Identifying the appropriate longer-term 
investments will require monitoring of existing trends, and assessment of their likely 
sustainability. 
Tipping points in the climate remain outside the scope of the vast majority of food production 
assessments, despite their high potential impact (Lenton and Schellnhuber, 2007; Lenton and 
Ciscar, 2013). Many climate-driven ecosystem regime shifts are related to food production and 
many share common drivers (Rocha et al., 2015), yet their impacts remain largely unknown or 
unquantified (King at al., 2015). For example, tropical deforestation can induce a continental-
scale tipping point in climate and affect agriculture across the globe, but the magnitude of the 
risk is unknown (Lawrence and Vandecar, 2015). Similarly, ocean warming and acidification has 
the potential to tip ecosystems, such as coral reefs, into rapid decline (Hoegh-Guldberg et al., 
2007). Further, it is unclear how the gradual changes in climate that affect global production 
patterns will interact with the growing incidence of extreme events to determine the 
agricultural landscapes of the future. More research is needed, not just into the underlying 
processes and likely outcomes, but also into the capacity of global agricultural and fisheries 
systems to be resilient in the face of climate change. Given the current lack of knowledge 
regarding abrupt change, monitoring – and where appropriate protecting – production 
overseas is a key UK policy gap. Such actions would have long lead times, making early 
detection and action of particular importance. 
Despite adaptation, reductions in overseas crop, livestock and fisheries productivity may alter 
food availability (Porter et al., 2014). Given the globalised nature of markets, the risk of shortages 
in any one major food is likely to be low relative to any risks posed by market responses (but 
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note the increasing risks of food substitution, and decreased safety and quality – risk It2, above). 
In particular, shifts in global production patterns may create a domestic business opportunity 
that could in turn lead to unsustainable practices being adopted. For example, rising wheat 
prices may result in a reduction of non-cropped land within agricultural landscapes, which may 
have implications for soils, water and biodiversity (English Nature, 1997). Maintaining natural 
capital to retain essential ecosystem services is an important area of public policy. There is some 
evidence of hedge removal in East Anglia, following the wheat price spike of 2012. If there is 
strong market-driven incentivisation of production, it becomes even more imperative to ensure 
it is sustainable. Chapter 3 discusses the implications of climate change for UK agriculture in 
more detail. 
The intensification of production will be limited by the amount and quality of agricultural land 
and the availability and costs of energy, inputs and water, as well as the need to conserve 
ecosystem services (water and soil quality, biodiversity and the cultural, recreational and 
amenity value of the countryside). Further limits will be imposed by year-to-year fluctuations in 
weather: more extremes of precipitation and temperature may cause direct yield losses and 
logistical problems (e.g. flooding in fields, difficulty in accessing the land, and soil compaction 
and loss). The manner in which the geography of global productivity changes over time will also 
depend on the combined impacts of changes in suitability of land to grow crops, and increases 
in extreme events.  
Within Europe, overall yields under a business as usual projection (3.5°C of global warming 
compared to pre-industrial levels) have been projected to decrease by around 10% by the 2080s. 
This change is not evenly distributed, however, with southern Europe experiencing 20% 
decreases (JRC, 2014). A more moderate scenario involving 2°C of warming still causes an 18% 
decrease in yields in southern Europe, even though this is counterbalanced by an expected 
increase of 32% in northern Europe, and 101% in the UK and Ireland. Given that EU states are 
major UK trading partners; this may provide an opportunity for increased exports. However, 
three issues make this opportunity less than clear-cut: 
• There is evidence that soil fertility in England and Wales has declined in recent decades and
the number of areas classified as ‘poor quality’ agricultural land is projected to increase from
14% currently to 70% by 2080 under the high emissions scenario; to 42% in a low emissions
scenario and 57% in a medium emissions scenario. The proportion of ‘good quality’
agricultural land is projected to fall from 38% currently to 4% (11% in a low emissions
scenario, 7% in a medium emissions scenario) (Defra, 2014a) (Chapter 3).
• If climate change and extreme weather in the UK are not well managed, then the UK may
become less productive and hence more dependent on imports. For example, there is some
evidence that winter wheat in northern Europe will experience more adverse weather events
than the south (Trnka et al., 2014; Trnka et al., 2015) (Chapter 3).
• Water availability for irrigation will also be a limiting factor for UK food production.
• The agricultural sector in the UK is reliant on migrant labour, with a strong presence of EU
migrants in UK food and agriculture sectors. Within Europe there is a higher likelihood of
negative impacts of climate change on agricultural production and on demand for labour.
This will have impacts, for example, on migration patterns in Mediterranean countries.
However, this is expected to lead predominantly to short distance rural–urban migration
within countries (Ciscar et al., 2011; de Haas, 2011; Foresight Report, 2011b).
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Looking forward, there is a need to identify the limits of sustainable production in the UK, both 
to protect domestic agriculture and also to act as a leader in global political thinking on 
sustainable production. 
Opportunity from changes in international trade routes (It7) 
The opening up of Arctic trade routes presents an opportunity for increased trade. Using Arctic 
trade routes to Asia will not likely affect trade volumes, but may help reduce transportation 
costs. It may also make the Pacific coast ports more accessible (via the Bering Strait), enabling 
more trade from the US extra-East Coast/Mississippi routes. The types of cargo carried over long 
distances between continents and the extra costs of these routes suggest that opportunities will 
remain limited out to 2050 and beyond (see Box 7.3). 
Currently Arctic shipping is a niche market undertaken by a small number of specialist shipping 
providers (primarily Fednav in the North West Passage and Sovcomflot in the Northern Sea 
route). The UK could be involved in insurance and other maritime services for these regions  
(Box 7.3). 
Box 7.3. Opportunities for the UK from Arctic change 
Assessments suggest that the potential for increased shipping activity in the Arctic will remain limited 
to 2050 and beyond. The potential for growth is most closely identified with increased demand for 
local community re-supply operations and tourism. It is anticipated that increased fishing and resource 
development may also increase demand for so-called destinational shipping (journeys between 
specific ports other than the major hub ports), but the extent of these activities in the future is 
uncertain. 
Shipping industry sources suggest the UK may benefit from increased access to the Arctic as a 
consequence of climate change. The main area where the UK could benefit is from increased tourism 
such as an increase in the number of UK registered cruise ships, if UK ports are increasingly used as a 
point of embarkation for passengers visiting the Arctic, and if UK domiciled tour and expedition 
operators are able to increase their market share. 
The UK could benefit from the provision of maritime services, especially from companies based in the 
City of London. UK companies are well placed to provide finance, insurance, underwriting, certification 
and classification, all of which will be necessary enablers of maritime activity in the Artic. However, 
insurers and underwriters remain cautious about providing services to Arctic shipping due to the 
potential risks involved.  
Sources: Lloyds (2014); Marsh (2014). 
7.2.4 Current adaptation and policy gaps 
As discussed in Section 7.2.1, UK objectives on food security focus on minimising market 
distortion and sustainable intensification supported by agri-tech innovation (Chapter 3 and 
Section 7.2.1). 
The first of the Government’s food security objectives aims to ensure a well-functioning trade 
system, tracked through the UK Food Security Assessment, which consists of monitoring a series 
of indicators (Defra, 2010). However, there are gaps in this approach. Under ‘normal’ conditions, 
and with a well-functioning and transparent market, a disturbance in one place will be buffered 
by the diversity of locations involved in trade. A strong reliance on international markets is 
Chapter 7   –   International dimensions              28
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Evidence Report 
sensible under ‘normal’ conditions. It promotes competitiveness on a global basis, reducing 
prices for consumers and creating economic gains for the best producers. The best producers 
are those that maximise efficiency (typically at scale) and make the most of local resources, 
including natural assets. 
However, climate change is changing weather patterns and ‘normal’ conditions are increasingly 
abnormal. Furthermore, two structural issues are creating systemic global risks (Centeno, 2015). 
First, international trade in commodities is increasing. Every country increasingly relies on trade 
to supply basic needs, which is a positive attribute when the market is stable but contributes to 
vulnerability if the market is disrupted (Puma et al., 2015). Second, the network structure is 
asymmetrical. Some breadbasket countries supply large amounts and thus are highly important 
nodes in the global market, connected to many countries around the world (Puma et al., 2015). 
Both these factors imply risks to the resilience of the global food system (GFS, 2015a; Lloyds, 
2015; Puma et al., 2015). Individual countries are embedded in a global system and 
unprecedented events coupled with over-compensatory market responses (mediated via export 
taxes, financialisation of commodity markets, biofuels, low levels of stocks, oil prices and 
exchange rates) can amplify shocks that propagate globally. As the system is global, no single 
country can manage it. Instead, there is a need to cooperate internationally to try to manage the 
market and achieve a resilient system. 
Climate change and extreme weather will reduce the resilience of highly efficient but vulnerable 
systems, that are well-adapted to normal conditions but without the ability to cope under stress. 
It is important that policy and international co-operation focus on stress testing the resilience of 
global markets to extreme and unprecedented conditions. Otherwise, the market will naturally 
respond to production with price spikes, with the implications for global markets and behaviour 
by individual trading partners as already discussed. 
The second and third elements of the Government’s food security strategy both aim to increase 
domestic production. Defra’s Sustainable Intensification Platform involves a number of pilot 
projects investigating ways to increase farm productivity while reducing environmental impacts 
and enhancing ecosystem services (Defra, 2013). The Government’s agri-tech strategy (HM 
Government, 2013) likewise aims to invest in intensifying production in a sustainable way. The 
CAP also aims to support the sustainable intensification of agriculture. However, sustainable 
intensification of UK production does not ensure UK food security. This is because (i) UK food 
security fundamentally relies on access to international markets and is not simply a property of 
growing more of what we are good at farming and (ii) sustainable intensification of agriculture 
does not necessarily create a resilient supply of food. It has not been possible to assess the 
effectiveness of the agri-tech strategy in helping to achieve the Government’s food security 
objectives, as evidence of the strategy’s impact is not yet available. There are also risks 
associated with the use of resources, in particular given the current state of soils (see Section 
7.2.3 and Chapter 3) 
In general, the Government’s current food security objectives do not address the food insecurity 
faced by the poorest economically in the UK or the resilience of the global food system. 
Sustainable intensification and increasing domestic agricultural production do not in 
themselves ensure access to affordable, safe food.  
The above analysis applies to the UK has a whole, since, while food security is a devolved matter, 
the goals of the devolved governments are similar to Defra’s policy objectives. National policies 
across the UK are mainly focused on domestic production, though different national 
governments take slightly differing roles in how they achieve it. For example, in Northern Ireland 
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the Government sets strategic regional land management policies to determine the most 
productive use of land. 
Climate resilience and food system sustainability are not currently core elements of food security 
policy. Given the global interconnected nature of food systems, resilience can only be built 
systemically. This, in turn, implies that policies be at least partially co-ordinated across different 
government departments and across international borders. Systemic resilience of the UK to the 
impact of extreme events abroad is of particular importance in ensuring long-term food security 
and capitalising on the opportunities associated with climate change. In the longer term the 
uncertainty in overall productivity, which results from the combined effects of extreme events 
and shifts in suitability (Section 7.4.2), creates an additional need for flexible and strategic policy 
on long-term resilience and sustainability. 
In summary, the main overall gap in relation to food is the lack of strategic co-ordination to 
build systemic resilience of the food system. There is currently no overarching strategy to 
tackle systemic vulnerability in the food system and to assess and measure the effectiveness of 
single actions (e.g. those promoting sustainability of agriculture or reducing waste) in tackling 
systemic vulnerabilities. The assumption that the market will deal with these issues is implicit, 
yet market responses to unprecedented or rare events may be unpredictable and exacerbate 
problems rather than solve them. Market actors therefore need strategic support to assess, 
analyse and adapt to growing systemic threats. In the area of food safety, for example, 
monitoring of trends and emerging threats beyond UK borders is central to identifying specific 
future risks.  
The House of Commons EFRA committee on food security has recommended that Defra appoint 
a Food Security Coordinator in order to bring about greater coherence across government on 
food security (EFRA, 2014). The need for a policy framework on food has been identified by 
stakeholders as a requirement, with its urgency resulting from the long lead times involved 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013, p. 47). The majority of risks identified here are considered to be 
not addressed due to the lack of a unified system or process to understand and manage UK food 
security in a global context; and the opportunities cannot be capitalised upon without joined-up 
thinking across government and beyond. The resilience of the food system is a cross-
departmental and cross-disciplinary issue; a Food Security Coordinator, if appointed, would 
therefore need to be cross-departmental (or independent) and multidisciplinary. This could be, 
for example, a strategic committee tasked with assessing evidence and improving management 
of knowledge and data in order to tackle systemic vulnerability of the food system. Over the last 
5 years, the UK’s Global Food Security programme has provided some degree of cross-
governmental analysis and horizon scanning capability. However, with the development of new 
research funding mechanisms, the UK’s Global Food Security programme is likely to cease. 
Incomplete understanding of the interconnections between components of the global food 
system, including between public and private bodies, is a major barrier to determining 
appropriate policy options. For example, a policy that forces supermarkets to donate excess 
food to charity (such as the policy introduced by France in 2015) improves food security and 
reduces waste in the short term, but it may discourage development of longer-term changes 
that could improve efficiency in the long term. Collective agreement between nations will then 
be important in ensuring market function and broader resilience in response to food shocks. The 
CAP, for example, could be an opportunity to build resilience, rather than being viewed as a 
simply a market distortion. Alongside international agreements, there are important roles for UK 
policy: supporting diversity of UK production as buffer to international shocks; and exploiting 
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the significant opportunities presented by climate change to catalyse improved food security, 
with the co-benefit of increased systemic resilience. Where international boundaries are crossed, 
as is the case with the global food system, separating exogenous and endogenous factors is 
extremely difficult (see e.g. (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). The use of plausible scenarios of 
multiple inter-related events provides a useful parallel of evidence for governments, 
international institutions and businesses to explore opportunities for co-ordinated risk 
management (GFS, 2015a). However, systemic failure might not be captured by this scenario-
based assessment. A systemic approach should acknowledge that the system is non-static, thus 
the solutions have to be adaptable, rather than rigidly applicable to a particular snapshot of the 
system (Downing, 2012). 
Areas in which strategic co-ordination is needed include (Table 7.3): 
• Management of change in the UK farm sector to improve systemic resilience. Current
policy to support open access to markets does provide some resilience. Further policies to
improve the functioning of international trade and markets would be beneficial. Market
indicators, such as stock-to-use and productivity, cannot be relied upon to ensure resilience,
since they lack any information on transience, which is central to any risk assessment. There
is an important branch of economic and evolutionary theory concerning the relative
performance of a system in stable versus variable conditions. If variability is sufficient,
increasing the resilience of the system (by reducing the fluctuations in performance) may be
a more favourable outcome, even if this has a cost in the long run. If the likelihood of
extreme weather is increasing, building resilience of our agricultural sector, even if it comes
at the expense of a reduction in average productivity, may be a rational strategy. As an
example, in a stable world, UK production of a specific food might struggle to be competitive
on a global basis. However, in the event of market disturbances, local production may have
strategic importance. But this should not be taken as a call to achieve domestic self-
sufficiency, which would be inefficient as well as unachievable in practice (Benton, 2013). The
global interconnected nature of food chains, coupled with the risk of climate-induced
production shocks and market responses (i.e. risk It1) leads to an increased tendency for
fluctuating market conditions. Under disruption, some strategically important sectors or
businesses may become (periodically) unviable economically. A UK food strategy needs to
assess the strategic importance of building resilience and maintaining (or increasing) a
diversity of production systems versus the economic costs (in the short and long term, under
‘normal’ and ’crisis’ conditions). Resilience to longer-term changes in agricultural
productivity – and any corresponding increased reliance on imports, or tendency towards
unsustainable intensification (risk It3) – will depend on how government policies and market
signals influence the UK farm sector.
• Support business, innovation and aid aimed at opportunities and adaptation overseas.
Climate change presents challenges on both short (e.g. risk It1) and long timescales. Major
long-term agricultural transformations will be required across the globe (risk It3). Some of
these changes will occur through market mechanisms and business investment, while others
will require policy support. There is also the potential for some business-led systemic
changes to be counterproductive in the long run (Rippke et al., 2016) simply by virtue of their
focus on shorter-term profits. Policy, supported by science, needs to identify the appropriate
pace of change for global agricultural systems, and support it. For example, the relative
merits of maintaining current cropped areas through increased investment in irrigation
versus infrastructure for systemic changes in crop production need to be assessed (Elliott et
al., 2014). The UK can play a leading role in supporting overseas agricultural adaptation. This
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represents not just a business opportunity, but also a lever for increasing resilience of the 
global food system. UK business and foreign aid can act to increase resilience in both the 
short and long term, for example, by helping maintain overseas transport and logistics, 
increasing adaptive capacity, promoting sustainability and increasing productivity (See 
Opportunity It1). This, in turn, will reduce UK vulnerability to climate change. A well-
managed UK farm sector and improved management of knowledge and data (see above) 
underpin much of this potential. 
• Resilience of supply chains. Supply chains can be affected by extreme weather directly via
transport, and indirectly via price spikes. Weather forecasting, from lead times of hours up to
a season, has the potential to strongly underpin resilience by supporting targeted action.
Capacity in global forecasting of risks from extreme events should therefore be supported,
especially where it is possible to provide high resolution information relating to key
transport nodes or production regions. The GFS report (GFS, 2015a) noted that there is
considerable uncertainty about increasing food system risks due to extreme weather and
climate change. Significant new research is needed to characterise it (e.g. AVOID2, 2014).
There is also an urgent need to develop understanding and capability leading to risk
assessment for multiple simultaneous breadbasket failures resulting from coincident
weather shocks in key regions. Any action that builds supply chain resilience directly
addresses (risk It1), as well as supporting exports. Actions to build resilience in supply chains
can be anticipatory or reactionary, in isolation or in combination.
• Identification of emerging food fraud and contamination risks. This action is a direct
result of risk It2. Required interventions will likely build upon existing food safety quality
regulation, as well as coordination between the main departments responsible (FSA, FSS and
Defra). Areas at high risk of fraud and contamination need to be identified and targeted in
order to close loopholes and provide consumer assurance. Increased surveillance and
prediction, co-ordinated mechanisms for obtaining rapid expert advice, and maintenance of
strategic food stocks are some potential intervention points (Tirado et al., 2010). Changes in
climate and geopolitics, coupled with the complex and international nature of supply chains,
mean that going forward, monitoring food safety at point of entry will remain necessary, but
is unlikely to be an effective strategy on its own. In addition to straightforward monitoring,
surveillance techniques can identify opportunities for food fraud and contamination. For
example, horse meat substitution was identified following the analysis of the Food Safety
Authority in Ireland of the price of beef alongside that of beef products. They noticed that
the price of beef was increasing, but not the price of beef products. Policies should be
accompanied by institutional coordination as well as capacity building to develop these
kinds of surveillance techniques. This would build on the ongoing work of the National Food
Crime Unit, based in and led by the FSA.
• Demand-side management to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from agriculture and
support long-term food security. UK food consumption patterns are among the causes of
climate change, as well as the broader environmental impacts arising from the global food
system. For example, 50 – 60% of the embedded water resources used to sustain UK
consumption of agricultural goods are sourced overseas (GFS, 2015b). Awareness of this
footprint is not widespread. Long-term planning in the overseas supply chain is one way for
the UK to contribute towards long-term sustainability and equity within the global food
system. Any action that increases sustainable practices, for example, by reducing waste or
increasing the efficiency of food production, processing and use via reduced consumption
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of meat, will support long-term food security at the same time as reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions. There is also the potential to improve health and nutrition (Chapter 5). 
Table 7.3. Policy areas needing strategic coordination to improve resilience of the food system 
Description Policy arena 
(Dom/EU/Int) and 
timescale 
Actors involved Address 
risks 
Address 
opportuniti
es 
Functioning of international 
trade and markets 
EU, international 
Immediate 
Defra, BIS, 
Academia, Industry 
It1 
Management of change in 
the UK farm sector for 
systemic resilience to 
climate change 
Domestic, EU 
All timescales, 
especially short-to-
medium 
Defra, Academia, 
Industry 
It1, It3, 
Chapter 6, 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 6, 
Chapter 3, 
It3 
UK business, innovation 
and aid aimed at 
opportunities and 
adaptation overseas  
Domestic, 
international 
All timescales 
BIS, DFID, industry It1, It3, 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6, 
It7, It3 
Resilience into supply 
chains 
EU, international, 
domestic 
Immediate 
Academia, 
Defra, FCO, BIS, 
DoH/ Department 
for Work and 
Pensions (DWP) 
It1, 
Chapter 4, 
Chapter 6 
Chapter 6, 
It3, It7 
Emerging food fraud and 
contamination risks 
Domestic, EU, 
international 
Begin planning 
within 5 years 
FSA and SFSA 
(Fraud and 
contamination) 
International 
monitoring? 
It2, 
Chapter5 
Demand-side management Domestic, EU 
Immediate action 
will enable 
medium-term 
change 
DoE, DoH, BIS, 
Defra, Department 
for Communities 
and Local 
Government, NHS, 
consumer 
associations 
Big society? 
It3, It1, 
Chapter 3 
Chapter 3, 
It3 
Source: CCRA authors. 
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7.3 Dimension 2: Migration and displacement risks 
7.3.1 Climate change as a driver of migration 
Climate change is unlikely to be the sole direct cause of migration but it will interact with and 
change the effects of other potential drivers. Drivers of migration include changes in relative 
wealth and income inequalities, persecution of individuals and communities, and conflict either 
within or between states. Migration can be short term (‘displacement’), and is often within states 
or to neighbouring countries (‘next safe place’). Longer-term international migration arises from 
sustained internal or regional conflict as well as changes in the economic attractiveness of an 
area. 
Migration has an impact on services, labour markets and long-term investments in both the 
origin and destination areas (Figure 7.6). The costs and benefits of migration are, in the main, 
directly incurred by those directly involved. Most voluntary migration brings long-term benefits 
for both sending and receiving areas. But there are significant social costs associated with both 
unplanned migration and exposure of people to weather hazards. The key social costs are due to 
(i) the local social and economic disruption caused by unplanned migration and (ii) the need to 
support displaced communities with humanitarian aid, or (iii) the investment in climate change 
adaptation that may be required to avoid exposed populations needing to move and be 
resettled. There will also be wider political and economic implications arising from migration, 
and as such it is linked with other geopolitical risks (Figure 7.7). Greater EU and international co-
operation on displaced people and unplanned migration will be required. 
Figure 7.6. Risks associated with long-term migration and short-term displacement 
Long-term 
climate 
change 
impacts on 
productivity 
and risk
Weather-
related 
shocks
Economic 
attractiveness 
and viability of 
areas and 
settlements
Displacement
yISKS and vOLICY ISSUES
Investment in protection Long term investments, impacts on insurance.
Disinvestment, planned 
resettlement
Impact on public services, 
labour markets, and social 
cohesion in depopulated and 
destination areas
Unplanned permanent
cigration
Impact on public services,
labour markets and social 
cohesion in destination areas
Temporary displacement 
and return, rebuilding 
and recovery
Demand for humanitarian 
assistance and public health
for internationally and 
internally displaced groups
Source: CCRA authors. 
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Some people may lack the resources to move, and these resources, for example land 
productivity and incomes, can be affected by climate change. This creates an attendant risk of 
‘trapped’ populations in areas exposed to significant climate-related risks (Black et al., 2011; 
Foresight Report, 2011b; Raleigh, 2011). Climate change could also alter patterns of migration in 
complex ways, by changing the relative attractiveness of destination countries. 
As displacement following weather extremes is usually limited to the affected areas and 
adjacent countries, the UK will be less susceptible to inward migration flows arising from 
displacement from countries outside of the EU. However, this is strongly dependent on UK and 
EU migration policies that regulate migration flows. 
Figure 7.7. Climate drivers, global migration-related risks and impacts on the UK 
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Source: CCRA authors. 
7.3.2 Migration policy 
Migration to the UK is managed by UK policies that are currently integrated with EU policies 
governing inward non-EU migration and free movement of EU citizens. These legal and policy 
frameworks do not explicitly recognise climate change, not least because of the difficulty of 
disentangling climate change from the principal drivers of migration. 
The UK opt-out from Title IV of the EU Treaty covering free movement, migration and asylum 
means that the numbers of migrants and displaced people to be admitted to the UK remains a 
matter for the UK Government to determine. The numbers of non-EU migrants to be admitted is 
under the competence of the UK policy for admission of non-EU labour migrants, which 
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emphasises admission by higher skilled workers through Tiers 1 and 2 of the work visa 
programme. The UK Government participated in the first phase of development of the EU’s 
Common European Asylum System (CEAS) and the development of common minimum 
standards, but in 2011, the Government stated its intention not to participate in further 
development of the CEAS. 
The EU developed the Global Approach to Migration during the 2005 UK Presidency of the EU 
Council, since renamed the Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM). This structures 
EU policy on migration and relations within non-EU member states. EU agencies support 
operational co-operation on border security (FRONTEX) and asylum (European Asylum Support 
Office). The UK has observer status within FRONTEX, and has participated in FRONTEX 
operations. The UK participates in the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), which offers 
operational support on asylum issues. 
In the context of the GAMM and EU climate policy, a Commission Staff Working Document 
‘Climate change, environmental degradation and migration’ (European Commission, 2013a) 
accompanied the EU Strategy on Adaptation to Climate Change (European Commission, 2013b) 
to provide an overview of research and data. 
International aid policies have an important role to manage this risk as they determine the UK’s 
role in addressing the root causes migration crises.12 The second pillar of the UK Aid strategy is 
strengthening resilience and avoiding crises around the world.  
7.3.3 Current risks and opportunities relating to migration and displacement 
Displacement as a result of weather-related extremes has, in general, much higher risks and 
costs than more long-term movement of investment and settlements as a result of changing 
economic comparative advantage. 
On the cost side, displacements might result in, for example, increased costs for public services 
and housing for changing populations in receiving areas. Under these conditions unplanned 
migration can cause social tension. Out-migration and de-population also have implications on 
economies of sending areas. Most attention in the relationship between climate change and 
migration is focused, however, on various forms of regular and irregular unplanned international 
migration. This represents only a small proportion of the aggregate movement of populations 
globally when compared to internal migration within states or regular migration flows 
authorised by national laws. The costs and risks associated with migration, and the relationship 
to climate change and extreme weather events are shown in Figure 7.7. 
Given the projected impacts of climate change globally, there will be an inevitable effect on 
movement of populations because of the changing economic geography of economic activity 
and settlement. Migration is a well-established adaptation to such changes, but also includes 
involuntary migration, or displacement, as a result of extreme weather events. 
The assessment here examines how risks from migration are transmitted to the UK. This 
includes, but is not restricted to, inward international migration of people to the UK. There are 
other significant transmission mechanisms related to, for example, demand for humanitarian 
12 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_final_ 
web_0905.pdf 
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assistance, and political and economic changes in other regions. All of these depend on the 
effectiveness of coordinated responses across policy domains, particularly at international level. 
Risks to the UK from weather-related international human displacements (It4) 
Displacement, in this context, means involuntary movement of people from their place of 
residence due to incidences of floods, coastal inundation, landslides, droughts and wildfires. 
Displacement is most often temporary and local in nature. For example the Pakistan floods of 
2010, led to an estimated 1.6 million damaged or destroyed homes, but virtually all 
displacement was localised and temporary (Looney, 2012). However, such displacement from 
extreme events in the past has had significant human cost, including health and economic costs, 
and also more permanent unplanned migration trends (Adger et al., 2014). Examples of such 
displacement and long-term migration include the impacts of Hurricane Katrina in the southern 
US. Significant numbers of those displaced by the storm event migrated permanently to other 
cities in the US (Fussell et al., 2010). 
The Norwegian Research Council provides estimates of displacement as a result of weather-
related disasters globally, and estimates 22 million people were displaced in 2013, including 
over 4 million people affected by Typhoon Haiyan in the Philippines13. On average, 27 million 
people per year were displaced between 2008 and 2013 (IDMC, 2014). 
Direct examination of such evidence, undertaken by the Foresight inquiry on Migration and 
Environmental Change (Foresight Report, 2011b), concluded that the risks of large-scale 
migration to the UK are low (Fielding, 2011; Findlay, 2011; Foresight Report, 2011b; Harper, 
2012). However, there are significant transnational diasporic communities in the UK that are 
likely to have links to areas affected by changes in climate around the world. Associated flows, 
such as remittances, have been shown to play a positive role in fostering economic 
development in disaster-affected areas and sustaining resilience. Officially recorded remittances 
from the UK in 2011 are estimated at £3.2 billion. World Bank estimates suggest the figure may 
be considerably higher, with the main recipient countries being India, Nigeria and Poland (World 
Bank, 2011). 
7.3.4 Future risks and opportunities relating to migration 
The key future risks are (i) changes in migration flows associated with increased displacement 
risks from extreme weather events and (ii) changes in migration patterns associated with longer-
term impacts of climate change on economic activity. Both have the potential to impact the UK 
from weather-related international human displacements (It4). 
At the global scale, it is well established that slower onset environmental change will interact 
with other migration drivers to influence primarily internal migration, but also international 
flows (Black et al., 2011). The effects on migration within the UK as a result of climate change, 
and changes in international flows (immigration and emigration to/from the UK) because of 
involuntary displacement are limited. Sensitivity of inward UK migration flows to climatic 
changes is low for the reasons already discussed; the local and temporary nature of most 
displacement, and the existence of UK and EU migration policies that regulate migration from 
affected areas. 
13  http://www.internal-displacement.org/assets/publications/2014/201409-global-estimates2.pdf 
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Most projections of socio-economic futures show that migration flows ultimately affect and can 
make major differences to national populations, and to some extent to the size of regional 
populations (Foresight Report, 2011b; Samir and Lutz, 2015). At the same time, most projections 
of future migration demonstrate the importance and necessity of international inward migration 
for countries with ageing populations and higher dependency ratios (O’Neill et al., 2015). But 
risks also arise from rapid urbanisation and the growth of urban slum areas in countries in 
demographic transition. 
Risks to the UK from weather-related displacement and migration (It4) 
Estimates of displacement associated with changes in all potential climate impacts in future are 
not reliable, and are reported in a piecemeal fashion, for example, in IPCC reports. However, 
estimates of populations at risk, and hence potentially displaced due to, for example, living in 
flood risk zones along coasts, show estimates of more than 70 million potentially at risk of 
displacement with a 0.5m sea level rise (e.g. Nicholls et al., 2011). All climate scenarios, 
simulations and overall assessments including the IPCC Special Report on Extremes (Field et al., 
2012) point to increasing weather-related displacement in many parts of the world. There are 
multiple potential causes of displacement; flooding in low-lying areas; flooding and storm 
surges in coastal areas; and drought in countries without major social safety nets for farming 
populations. 
A key risk is vulnerable groups who lack the resources to move and can be ‘trapped’ in areas 
exposed to high climate risk. This will limit international migration flows to the UK due to the 
high cost to migrants of such long distance movements. Hence, climate change may not be 
strongly detectable as cause for UK international migration arrivals. Rather, the impacts of 
climate change, especially on resource-dependent sectors in developing countries, may increase 
the likelihood of shorter distance movements within countries and to neighbouring states 
(Foresight Report, 2011b; Hugo, 1996). 
Future scenarios where population movements are constrained such as Shared Socio-Economic 
Pathways SSP3 ‘Regional Rivalry’ (O’Neill et al., 2015), highlight how population movements can 
lead to poorly planned settlements around large urban areas. This is to be expected particularly 
in low-income countries with greater populations at risk from the impacts of weather-related 
extremes. 
One further and major issue is the displacement associated with civil conflict and how such 
conflict could be affected by climate change. There is an ongoing, contested scientific debate on 
the causality between climate change, resource scarcity and the triggering or amplification of 
civil conflict and risk. While some studies portray the links as self-evident, other analysis has 
found no compelling evidence, as yet, that climate change has been a significant factor in the 
pattern of observed conflicts over the past half century (Gledditsch, 2012). There is, for example, 
contested evidence on the role of drought in the present Syrian conflict (Gleick, 2014). Kelley et 
al. (2015) highlight that Syria experienced drought since 2006, and that the likelihood of this 
drought was exacerbated by climate change. However, there is no academically agreed 
evidence that the drought conditions in the region, including in neighbouring countries, were a 
significant cause or trigger of the present conflict in Syria. In summary, the complex dynamics of 
conflict in Syria and the region involve multiple factors, even if drought conditions contributed 
to the complex emergency. 
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The IPCC reports conclude that the role of climate change in conflict is uncertain, but there are 
significant reasons for concern in the future if climate change were to affect the livelihood of 
poor populations, given the strong association of poverty with civil conflict (Adger et al., 2014). 
Altered settlement and migration patterns due to changing economic viability (It4) 
As well as immediate displacement and migration risks, discussed above, climate change will 
interact with longer-term economic trends to potentially affect migration flows. Some potential 
mechanisms are (i) disinvestment in areas at risk, including withdrawal of insurance, making 
them less economically attractive; and (ii) planned relocation of settlements. 
Slower onset and longer-term environmental changes interact with well-established economic, 
social, political and demographic drivers of migration, and with wider global trends, such as 
urbanisation, to make some areas less attractive as destinations. Slower onset climatic changes 
include rising sea levels and coastal inundation, changes in tropical storm and cyclone 
frequency or intensity, changes in rainfall regimes, increases in temperature and melting of 
mountain glaciers. 
Coastal areas might be particularly impacted as property and agricultural land in coastal areas 
may be considered too expensive to protect against increasing coastal storminess and sea-level 
rise. The increasing costs of coastal protection are evidenced around the world, with projections 
often assuming that protection that is affordable to a country will be implemented (Hinkel et al., 
2014). Hallegatte (2012) demonstrates that economic activities to defend urban infrastructure 
from sea-level rise risk locking-in patterns of development that ultimately have high costs and 
may not be sustainable in the long run. 
Long-term shifts in economic prosperity affect overall migration flows towards economic 
opportunities in less affected regions. Some sectors, such as agriculture may change their 
demand for non-UK labour, but assessments to date portray impacts as marginal with many 
mediating factors (Findlay, 2011; Foresight Report, 2011b). 
All changes in inward migration patterns to the UK, whether associated with climate change or 
economic drivers, might lead to increased demand for a range of social services. Both migration 
and routine travel contribute to spread disease, and thus attribution to migration is unclear 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). Fielding (2011) stresses the importance of effective 
governance of health care and assesses the risk of disease transmission as low (see discussion 
below). As highlighted above, the UK agricultural sector also represents a demand for 
international seasonal labour and hence the resilience of the UK agricultural sector depends on 
the availability of labour at peak harvest and other seasons (see, for example, Migration Advisory 
Committee, 2013; Scott et al., 2008). Migrant workers also play an important role in the provision 
of health and social care in the UK. 
7.3.5 Current adaptation and policy gaps 
Many policy areas interact to result in net migration flows. Trends in demographic change, 
ageing populations, labour market integration and other issues affect every region of the world 
(Harper, 2012).  
Multilateral action will likely be required to address migration issues. For the UK, national 
restrictions alone are unlikely to reduce the flows of international migrants linked to income and 
wealth inequalities, the effects of conflict either within or between states, and the risks 
associated with people smuggling and trafficking.  
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The assessment and management of risks from changes in migration patterns associated with 
climate change are therefore dependent on the effectiveness of international responses to 
migration, particularly at EU level given its geographical position and pressures.14 There are also 
already links between UK and EU migration and other policy fields such as adaptation to climate 
change within Europe, poverty reduction, development assistance in sending countries, and 
peace and security interventions overseas.  
The European Agenda on Migration (European Commission, 2015) identified climate change as a 
potential cause of displacement along with civil war, persecution and poverty. Proposed 
measures included military action to combat smuggling networks, as well as efforts to address 
root causes of migration and consider legal options for migration to the EU. The UK has not 
opted in to any of the EU’s immigration directives covering long-term residents who are third 
country nationals, family reunification, return of illegal immigrants, and migrant workers in 
seasonal employment. The UK has consistently asserted its right to maintain border controls and 
does not participate in the EU’s Schengen system.  
For example, the UK Government has declined to participate in a Commission-proposed plan for 
the EU/ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) to relocate 20,000 vulnerable 
people from the Middle East, North Africa and the Horn of Africa to EU member states and in 
Commission plans to relocate up to 40,000 asylum applicants from Italy and Greece. The EU 
relocation scheme target was expanded on 22 Sept 2015 to provide for an additional 120,000 
asylum applicants (http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_STATEMENT-15-5697_en.htm). 
The UK Government participates in the Steering Group of the Khartoum Process of dialogue on 
migration between the EU and African Union. This is focused on the Horn of Africa, but without 
explicit reference in its remit to effects of climate change on migration. 
To develop links with other policy areas that enhance climate resilience outside the UK, policy 
gaps include: 
• Enhancing regulations and interventions to avoid the existing gap in policies and formal
mechanisms that leave migrants in need for legal recognition, primary assistance, safe
relocation or return (the so-called ‘protection gap’).
• Planning for integrated resilience in countries worldwide by improving both the urban and
rural environments and building sustainable communities able to cope with climate change
and extreme weather impacts.
• Facilitating migration as a form of adaptation to climate change through, for example,
schemes promoting temporary or circular migration.
• Developing a co-ordinated response at EU level through assessing the role of migration and
displacement within EU strategies for agriculture and development.
• Ensuring secure and effective mechanisms for the transmission of remittances.
There have been significant calls for greater recognition in political systems of populations 
displaced, or potentially displaced in the future because of climate change. This could include 
giving people permanently displaced from their homes recognition under the Geneva 
14 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/478834/ODA_strategy_ 
final_web_0905.pdf 
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Convention on Refugees (Biermann and Boas, 2008). However, changes to international 
protection laws to cover ‘environmental’ or ‘climate’ refugees have been largely ruled out, or are 
highly unlikely because of (i) the impossibility of disentangling environmental causes of 
displacement from other economic, social, political and demographic drivers and (ii) the 
existence of little evidence of political or legal support at national or international level, 
including from UNHCR, for such measures (Foresight Report, 2011b; McAdam, 2011; Piguet et al., 
2011). Substantive progress is more likely through state-led consultative processes such as the 
state-led Nansen Initiative or through recognition in existing mechanisms such as the Kampala 
Convention covering internal displacement in the African Union.  
On the other hand, international development aid plays a crucial role in managing the 
underlying causes of migration (Ashdown, 2011), which gaps are discussed in 7.4.4. Addressing 
these gaps will play a crucial role to manage migration risk, and unilateral intervention has 
limited scope, hence the importance of the UK’s role in ifluencing and fostering international 
goals on development. 
As mentioned above, much of the scientific literature concludes that it is impractical to 
disentangle climate change from other drivers of migration (Adger et al., 2014). Climate change 
is therefore not a simple ‘migration trigger’. Interactions of climate change with income and 
wealth inequalities, and with conflict within or between states, can lead people to move, but the 
majority of this movement is likely to be within states or to neighbouring states. The effects of 
income and wealth inequalities and of conflict may also be to make it more difficult for some 
people to move, with the risk that they become ‘trapped’ in areas in which they are exposed to 
climate risk.  
There are benefits for policy initiatives that build sensitivity to climate change into wider 
migration policies. For example, UK engagement with the EU and wider international policy 
framework on migration could ensure it incorporates and anticipates climate change impacts on 
existing migration flows. Policy appraisal could consider both the likely migration flows and the 
effects of immobility among vulnerable populations. The range of policy areas affected is broad, 
including development, adaptation, urban resilience, and peace and security. International co-
ordination of these policy fields need to be integrated into migration policy (European 
Commission, 2013a). The need for incorporation of displacement and complex emergencies in 
defence planning is recognised in assessing strategic trends, such as the Global Strategic Trends 
to 2045 developed by the Ministry of Defence. 
7.4 Dimension 3: Risks associated with geopolitical dimensions of 
climate change 
7.4.1 Climate change and geopolitical risks 
Climate change poses significant risks to national and international security through economic 
costs and risks to territorial integrity. The impacts of climate change are highlighted in many 
scientific assessments as threat multipliers in already fragile states and regions, acting by 
increasing the stress on governance structures and resource availability (Figure 7.8). 
All of these dimensions represent both current and future risks, including: 
• an increased demand for humanitarian assistance,
• state failure and violent conflict leading to UK interventions,
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• breakdown in international law and governance,
• economic consequences in regions important to UK interests, and
• biosecurity threats that could be transmitted to the UK as well as those that require
international co-operation and co-ordination to control.
These risks directly interact with each other and with other dimensions such as changes in 
migration flows discussed above. As such, risks and impacts are difficult to assess and quantify. 
Figure 7.8. Climate drivers, global geopolitical risks and impacts to the UK 
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Source: CCRA authors. 
7.4.2 Conflict, development assistance, biosecurity and international co-operation 
policies 
Several UK government departments have central roles in developing and enforcing 
international policies related to conflicts, development, biosecurity and international co-
operation. These include DFID, the FCO, the MoD, the Home Office and DoH. Other departments 
play important roles in areas where close international co-operation is needed, such as Defra in 
relation to EU policy on food and agriculture, DECC on climate change mitigation, and BIS 
through the UK Trade and Investment agency (UKTI). 
International development and aid funds are legislated through the International Development 
Act (HM Government, 2015b), which stems from Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC) requirements of which the UK 
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is part (DfID, 2013). The Act requires government expenditure in overseas aid to be at least 0.7% 
of UK Gross National Income. This target was met in 2013 and 2014 (DfID, 2013, 2015).The main 
expenditure goes through DfID, as well as through the FCO, MoD, DECC. 
The role of climate change as a risk multiplier for development and aid issues is recognised in 
the International Climate Fund. This has committed £3.87bn over the 2011 – 2016 period. This 
budget is programmed, thus the timeline of the actual expenditure is different. As a comparison, 
public international expenditure on climate adaptation is globally about £25 billion per year 
(OECD, 2015). The fund is managed by DfID, DECC and Defra, and aims to help target countries 
to adapt to climate change and reduce their emissions. The Government has committed to 
increase this spending by at least 50%, rising to £5.8bn over the following five years. 
The National Security Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015 (HM 
Government, 2015a) also recognises the role of climate change as ‘risk multiplier’ expected to 
aggravate existing pressures within and between countries. The UK highlighted climate change 
as a risk when it chaired the United Nations Security Council in 2007 (Harris, 2012). 
Climate change adaptation and links with development aid are recognised in the Strategic 
Defence and Security Review (2010) and the subsequent Building Stability Overseas Strategy 
(HM Government, 2011). This strategy aimed to integrate the work on conflict prevention within 
the actions toward the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals. Until 2015, the main 
instrument to achieve this was the Conflict Pool, delivered jointly by DfID, FCO and MoD. 
However, the pool was replaced in 2015 by a Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), which 
has “more of a top-down approach with more NSC [National Security Council] oversight and an 
emphasis on in-county impact” (FCO, 2015). UK average defence expenditure amounts to tens of 
billion pounds.15 
In terms of international law and governance, the UK has tens of thousands of bilateral, multi-
lateral agreements and conventions (FCO, 2015). These agreements are needed to maintain the 
UK’s economic interests, such as maintaining open and stable international trade, and also in 
buffering the risks discussed in this chapter. 
Other important international agreements relate to climate change mitigation and adaptation 
(for example the Paris Agreement of December 2015 and the United Nations Sustainable 
Development Goals for 2030 (SDGs, United Nations, 2015b), also agreed in 2015). If fulfilled, in 
practice these agreements would help address many of the drivers of the risks discussed in this 
chapter, including unsustainable economic development and use of resources, and state 
fragility to weather extremes. The latter will be influenced by the willingness of states to 
implement the principles of the Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction (SDRR) (United 
Nations, 2015a), including the reporting of progress in managing disaster risks. Neither the SDGs 
nor the SFDRR are legally binding.  
15  https://data.gov.uk/dataset/uk_defence_statistics 
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7.4.3 Current and future risks and opportunities 
Increased demand for humanitarian and overseas development assistance (It1, It3, It4, 
 It5, It6) 
At present, humanitarian assistance is a varying proportion of DfID’s expenditure in any year. 
Unforeseen expenditure arises from weather-related disasters such as Typhoon Haiyan, the 
recent floods in Pakistan and drought in the Horn of Africa. This expenditure diverts resources 
from longer-term development and resilience building activity. At present, only around 5% of 
expenditure on emergency assistance is allocated to disaster risk reduction globally (GHA, 2015). 
Since the Government has committed to spend 0.7% of Gross National Income on Official 
Development Assistance (ODA), the capacity of the UK to provide aid overseas is directly linked 
to the strength of the national economy. 
Projections show that the demand for humanitarian assistance will increase, largely due to 
climate change, by 2030. There is uncertainty in the actual figure that ranges from 32% to 
1,600% by 2030 (Webster et al., 2009). If other countries meet this demand, it could lead to the 
UK’s role and influence being diminished internationally. A decline in the UK’s relative role 
globally could lead traditional recipients of UK development assistance in Africa and South Asia 
to become increasingly reliant on other countries for aid. A number of these recipients are 
former colonies with traditionally strong ties to the UK through the Commonwealth 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013). A core risk to the UK is that countries that have fewer vested 
interests in global open markets may step in, providing aid in exchange for bilateral agreements, 
which secure long-term access to land and strategic resources. Failure to respond to 
humanitarian crises might also have a political impact domestically, for example through public 
opinion. The Ashdown Review (Ashdown, 2011) of DfID priorities relating to humanitarian 
assistance suggested that a more pro-active strategy is needed to build resilience in disaster-
prone regions. The need for building long -term resilience and coordinating climate change, 
disaster risk reduction and development policies is underlined by several sources (Royal Society, 
2014; United Nations, 2015a; United Nations, 2015b). 
An increased demand for humanitarian assistance will result from many of the drivers already 
analysed in this chapter, namely production shocks, long-term changes in global production 
patterns, weather-related human displacements, violent conflicts, and biosecurity and disease 
risks. Having to shift limited UK spending from longer-term development to short-term 
humanitarian assistance in response to events will undermine efforts to build in-country 
resilience and, as a consequence, exacerbate the risks discussed elsewhere in this chapter. 
State failure, instability and conflict risk (It5) 
Fragile states in crisis are unable to provide basic services to their citizens including imposing 
the rule of law. Failed states have significant consequences for neighbouring states and regions. 
Recent conflicts in Darfur, Mali and Syria have taken place in the context of weather-related 
disasters or recovery from drought (Box 7.2; CAP, 2013; Adger et al., 2014; Gleick, 2014; Kelley et 
al., 2015; Harris et al., 2013; Peters and Mayhew, 2015). While there is significant debate about 
the relative role of weather-related resource scarcity in conflict, states with weak governing 
institutions may see greater internal conflict as a consequence of competition between different 
sectors or increased population stress (e.g. rural communities moving into urban areas in search 
of jobs after agricultural livelihoods are suppressed). 
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Instability in global food markets also impacts on security and conflict in fragile states. The 
Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa are particularly exposed to volatility in world food markets, 
and this can have ramifications for how the UK responds to conflict in these regions (MoD, 2014) 
As discussed in Section 7.1, there is ongoing scientific debate on the influence of climate change 
and resource scarcity in triggering or amplifying present and recent civil conflicts (e.g. 
Gledditsch, 2012, and Gleick, 2014, are two examples of diverging views). However, many of the 
factors that increase the risk of civil war and other armed conflicts are sensitive to climate 
change (e.g. low per capita incomes) (Adger et al., 2014). The IPCC reports conclude that the role 
of climate change in conflict is uncertain, but there are significant reasons for concern if climate 
change affects the livelihood of poor populations, given the strong association of poverty with 
civil conflict (Adger et al., 2014). In many civil conflicts in the past half-century, resource scarcity 
has been evident, even if not a triggering factor for conflict. Indeed, the IPCC reports highlight 
that regions in conflict and post-conflict countries have low adaptive capacity and may 
themselves be highly vulnerable to future impacts of climate change (Adger et al., 2014). 
Future impacts of climate change may exacerbate resource scarcity stresses by displacement of 
rural communities, reduced availability of food, energy and water to different sections of the 
population, or increased incidence of disease (putting a subsequent additional strain on health 
services). In the case of extreme weather, states that are burdened with repair or rebuilding costs 
associated with environmental disasters may be less capable of providing health, social and 
security services to their whole population (Smith, 2011). 
Competition over water availability and access within states and between communities and 
different users of water (for example crop irrigation versus livestock watering) has a strong 
association with physical conflict and a contributory role in internal state instability (see Box 7.2). 
Future risks to the UK are three-fold. First, state failure in a given area may require greater 
proportions of UK (and other) aid to be channelled to humanitarian assistance, reducing the 
funds available for longer-term economic development and adaptation actions thus failing to 
address some of the root causes (United Nations, 2015a; United Nations, 2015b). Second, the 
breakdown of state structures can lead to greater insecurity of trade and transportation through 
the area. For example, the collapse of state authority in Somalia led to a period of increased 
piracy in the Indian Ocean that required a large multi-lateral naval mobilisation to suppress it. 
Analysis of the micro-dynamics of conflict show that observed conflicts can lead to migration. 
Populations might also be rendered less mobile and effectively trapped in conflict zones 
(Raleigh, 2011). Finally, in extreme cases, state failure may require military presence by 
international forces (including from the UK) to control non-state elements including terrorist 
organisations. 
Ongoing assessments by the US security services conclude that climate change will increase the 
frequency, scale and complexity of future military missions (CNA, 2014; US Department of 
Defense, 2014). The UK's limited military capability may be challenged by increasing, concurrent, 
demands for deployment to provide humanitarian assistance, conflict intervention and peace-
keeping. In parallel, climate impacts in the UK will also periodically require military assistance,  
as was necessary during recent flood events. Increased demand for reactive military  
intervention might detract resources from longer-term, preventive measures, potentially 
exacerbating the risks. 
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Breakdown of international law and governance (It6) 
The impacts of climate change pose risks to international law and stability by overwhelming the 
capacity of global institutions to respond to local crises, whether these take the form of civil 
wars, state failure, disease outbreaks or environmental disasters (Foresight Report, 2011a). 
Increased pressure around the world for access to food, energy and water resources, 
exacerbated by climate change, could lead to an increase of state-led enterprise, resource 
protectionism and strategic bilateral agreements that secure long-term access to resources at 
the expense of the global markets upon which UK businesses rely (Paskal, 2009; 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013; GST, 2014). Such challenges will need strengthened core global 
governance structures that promote free trade and open markets while also providing a 
legitimate source of arbitration for disputes. However, such institutions will likely be dependent 
on their capacity to respond to crises in ways that are perceived to be legitimate. 
The impacts of climate change could also increase the risk of attempts to revise established 
principles of international law and governance. For example, the UN Law of the Sea establishes 
the economic, territorial and sovereignty rights of coastal states over maritime spaces. Rising sea 
levels, coastal erosion and the migration of fish stocks may all lead to the disruption of 
international relations if countries increasingly question the status quo legal order to increase 
their maritime rights (Paskal, 2009). Similar attempts at revision of use agreements are likely over 
transboundary resource-sharing agreements (e.g. over fisheries, water usage, see Box 7.2) in 
response to climate-induced changes in water flows or resource abundance. The adherence of 
global emission targets discussed at the COP21 (December 2015) will define the future 
directions of climate change.  
Risks to the UK arise through spill-over effects, from increased political tension and even conflict 
between states. International legal mechanisms and river basin institutions contribute to the 
transboundary capacity to anticipate and respond to stresses and the ability to manage conflict 
effectively (Adger et al., 2014). The UK has been actively involved in supporting multi-lateral 
initiatives to promote institutions for transboundary water management, for example in the Nile 
and parts of south Asia. Current tensions and rivalry between states in transboundary basins will 
be significantly challenged by projected regional climate change. The capacity of current 
conflict resolution mechanisms will also be challenged. There are potential opportunities over 
shared resources, such as changes in the Arctic providing increased demand for UK maritime 
services, though many such opportunities are highly uncertain (Box 7.3). 
Transmission of global disease risks to the UK (NE9, chapter 3 and PB11, chapter5) 
Major disease risks to the UK threaten human, animal and plant health. Climate change may be 
an important contributor to these risks, either directly (climate change acts on a climate-
sensitive disease) or indirectly (climate change acts on another driver of the emergence and 
spread of diseases, such as land use change or conflict). The risk to the UK arises by two main 
routes. First, climate change may cause an exotic disease to spread towards and, eventually, into 
the UK. Second, climate change may trigger disease emergence elsewhere in the world, which 
then reaches the UK from the international movements of people and goods. 
For example, bluetongue is an insect-borne viral disease of wild and domestic ruminants, 
including cattle and sheep. It was considered an exotic disease in Europe until 1998. Since then, 
it has repeatedly entered the continent, leading to the deaths of well over a million animals, as 
well as significant economic losses because of lost opportunities to trade. In 2007 alone, the 
Chapter 7   –   International dimensions              46
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Evidence Report 
bluetongue epidemic is estimated to have cost €1.4 billion to the French economy (Tabachnick 
et al., 2008). The emergence of bluetongue in Europe is associated with the effects of changes to 
elevated mean temperatures on and the ability of the insects to spread the virus, as well as 
extreme weather events (Guis et al., 2012). In 2006, following an unprecedented period of hot 
weather, bluetongue appeared in northern Europe for the first time. It spread to the UK in 2007 
in two ways. First, infected insect vectors were able to cross the Channel (Gloster et al., 2008). 
Second, despite restrictions on the trade in livestock from infected regions of Europe, infected 
cattle were nevertheless imported (Menzies et al., 2008) (see Chapter 3). 
Another example is how global travel and trade are driving the spread of mosquito vectors of 
human disease. The trade in used car tyres, for example, has helped the Asian tiger mosquito, 
Aedes albopictus, spread to many parts of the world. This mosquito was first found in Europe in 
1979 and has now spread over many parts of southern Europe. It is able to transmit both dengue 
fever and a viral fever called chikungunya. Change in the mean climate will also facilitate the 
spread of the Asian tiger mosquito towards the UK (Caminade et al., 2012). Movements of 
vehicles under or across the Channel may facilitate its eventual entry. Outbreaks of Chikungunya 
in France have been linked to extreme precipitation events (Roiz et al., 2015). The role of climate 
change in the recent outbreak of the zika virus in central and South America is a subject of active 
debate. Warmer and wetter conditions facilitate the transmission of mosquito-borne diseases 
like zika (see Chapter 5). 
7.4.4 Current adaptation and policy gaps 
As discussed in the previous section, the impacts to the UK from state failure and international 
conflict affect the UK by increasing the demand for intervention and humanitarian aid. This in 
turn detracts funds away from building long-term resilience to these risks, such as through 
promoting sustainable development and addressing state fragility. 
The ability of current policies to address these risks therefore depends on whether they build 
long-term capacity for countries to address state fragility, meet economic development needs, 
and reduce disaster risks.  
The proportion of expenditure in each different development area (including humanitarian aid 
versus sustainable development) is not regulated, except for the geographical destination (DfID, 
2012; House of Commons, 2015). While the pre-2015 Conflict Pool was considered an effective 
instrument to promote stability in fragile states, there are concerns that the new Conflict, 
Stability and Security Fund (CSSF) might result in a shift towards more short-term interventions 
(rapid response) at the expense of long-term resilience and conflict prevention (SaferWorld, 
2014). Shifts in development expenditure towards humanitarian aid, in response to events, 
similarly decreases the focus on improving governance and capacity (House of Commons, 2015; 
IDC, 2015). The Government disagreed with this point but did not provide evidence to the 
contrary (HM Government, 2015b). Furthermore, the CSSF is a single-sector intervention, thus 
may not address systemic issues and their consequences (Ruttinger et al., 2015). There is no data 
on how UK funds impact on the level of in-country adaptation, or in achieving Sustainable 
Development Goals or aiding the implementation of the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk 
Reduction. Despite the growing recognition of the importance of adaptation (Denton et al., 
2014), there are not yet internationally agreed indicators to measure progress in countries 
(UNEP, 2014). As discussed in section 7.3.5, there is limited scope for unilateral intervention on 
geopolitical risks. The UK can play an important role in influencing and fostering international 
goals such as SDG or the application of SFDRR. 
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As with food security risks, there is a lack of systematic monitoring of the trends and early 
warning of potential breakdowns in governance, and the threats posed by inter-state rivalry 
over resources sensitive to climate change. This lack of early warning, as well as shortcomings in 
planning and implementation, is highlighted in the G7 report ‘A new climate for peace’ (German 
G7 Presidency, 2015). The UK’s economic interests are widespread and dependent on open and 
stable international trade. Hence there is a likely benefit for the UK to invest in multi-lateral co-
operation to promote long-term stability of international law and governance regimes (such as 
the UN Law of the Sea) that may be threatened by resource scarcity and state rivalry over 
resources. 
7.5 Conclusions 
This chapter shows that the risks to the UK from climate change are broader and more complex 
than simply those originating within UK territory. The UK is highly integrated into global 
markets, systems and frameworks through its open economy, interactions with European and 
global populations, institutions, cultures and economies, and through the movement of goods, 
services and people. The risks identified in previous chapters will interact with, and are often 
amplified by, climate change affecting Europe and other parts of the world. UK responses to 
global risks interact with and can exacerbate challenges and dilemmas in domestic adaptation 
actions and policies. This is particularly true of the challenges of sustainable food production 
and land use. 
This chapter also highlights that many of the solutions and potential positive opportunities 
associated with climate change are also highly international in their nature. The role of the 
European Union and its relationship with the UK is critical, for example, in responding to food 
system resilience, and in harmonising responses to migration and labour flows that are sensitive 
to climate impacts within Europe and internationally. There is also significant potential to use 
the international climate change agenda to improve food systems and health, since altered 
patterns of food demand that improve health (e.g. reducing obesity) also tend to reduce the 
carbon footprint of food production. 
The risk assessment in this chapter is limited by the predictive ability of models and by the 
limitations of observed experience. The international dimensions of risk arise through 
interacting processes and systems, and many of the feedbacks, for example between 
international trade, food systems and conflict, are not well characterised or understood. While 
climate change is one of many risks within the spectrum of challenges facing global 
communities, it is one that is likely to increase in importance as a driver of insecurity, and this 
will have implications for the UK. For higher levels of warming, and more rapid warming rates, 
the evidence and models are limited in their ability to predict the future with any confidence, 
and hence the uncertainty itself becomes a major issue within the international dimensions of 
risk discussed here. The characterisation of the risks can be improved through targeted research. 
Focused policy that cuts across all relevant government departments can build resilience, 
regardless of the uncertainty in future projections.  
7.5.1 Priorities for action in the next five years 
The risks and opportunities identified in this chapter have been scored according to their 
urgency, following the method presented in Chapter 2. The three key dimensions of 
international risk (global food systems, migration and displacement, and geopolitical issues) are 
inter-related in terms of both causes and consequences. Each of the risks and opportunities 
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identified in this chapter is complex, in the sense of having emergent and interacting properties. 
Analysis in this area involves scenarios, models and forecasts of the behaviour of actors such as 
governments, but all analysis involves deep uncertainty. Although limited quantitative 
assessment is available, evidence indicates that international risks to the UK are already of high 
magnitude and are likely to increase with further increases in global temperature. 
Overarching policy gaps include the lack of strategic cooperation within and between the three 
dimensions considered: food systems, migration and geopolitical risks. Policy gaps include a lack 
of coordination between humanitarian, development, trade, foreign, food and security 
strategies, and the lack of knowledge and data management and its strategic use. In particular, 
improvements in the global food system need to be achieved by trade policy that supports the 
role of markets yet builds domestic resilience to price spikes and market shocks. Relying on 
market responses to manage imbalances in supply and demand is appropriate under standard 
expected levels of variability but leaves the UK exposed to impacts when markets are under 
stress. The lack of a unified system or process to understand and manage the role of the UK 
within global food systems is the principal barrier to the improvement of systemic resilience. In 
recognition of this, the House of Commons EFRA committee on food security, for example, 
recommended that Defra appoint a Food Security Coordinator.  
Another key priority is for the UK to co-ordinate adaptation to climate change globally, with 
international partners including the EU. This includes the coordination of development 
assistance with the EU to reduce migration and conflict risks in other regions; and the 
development of common strategies and harmonised policies for biosecurity risks, assistance to 
people displaced due to weather-related extremes in home countries, and on agreed policies 
with the EU for how countries should respond to variations in food availability and price spikes 
in global food commodities. 
7.5.2 Key research gaps 
The priorities for further research identified in this chapter are to: 
• Reduce uncertainty in assessments of the risk posed by climate change to major global
agricultural commodity producing regions. This includes improving the robustness of
assessments through multiple methods, from modelling, to scenario generation, to
observational studies, including government responses to spikes and volatility.
• Quantify the covariate nature of risk of multiple food production failures in world regions.
• Surveillance systems to monitor food safety at source and through complex international
supply chains.
• Assess national government and other strategic actor behaviour in the face of increased
volatility in food access, population movement and conflict risks. The assessment could
include, for example, risks associated with foreign direct investment to secure food
production and export bans to ensure domestic food availability.
• Characterise and quantify the risks of displacement and of trapped populations arising from
weather-related extremes in vulnerable areas worldwide in order to consider the demand for
humanitarian assistance as well as the wider risks of political instability.
• Assess the design and potential reform of institutions for global and regional co-operation to
avoid and manage instability and resolve disputes arising from climate change, for example
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over transboundary water resources, Arctic region impacts, changing access to Exclusive 
Economic Zones, and risks of state failure. 
• Assess the design and potential reform of allocation of funding for humanitarian aid versus
long-term sustainable development, including tracking and measuring impacts of long-term
development aid in reducing risks of humanitarian crisis.
• Assess the risk posed by abrupt change and climate tipping points to global food production
including an assessment of the likelihood, impact and geopolitical consequences of climate
change and food insecurity.
• Characterise and quantify food system risks in supply chains, nutrition, and political
instability due to extreme weather and climate change.
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Annex 7.A Policy tables 
Table 7.A1. Food policy framework 
Policy reference UK nation Key effects of this policy in 
addressing climate risks  
Links to other policies 
UK Food Security 
Strategy 
The strategy has not 
yet been published (as 
06/16), but the 
Government response 
to the EFRA committee 
report on food security 
(EFRA, 2014) provides 
a description on 
current Government’s 
food security strategy 
UK The objectives of the 
government food security 
policy are: 
1. Access to a wide variety
of markets and an open,
rules-based world trading
system
2. Sustainable
intensification
3. Agri-Tech Strategy.
CAP 
Agri-Tech strategy 
AMIS 
TTIP/WTO, etc. 
Northern Ireland food 
strategic action plan: 
Going for Growth 
(Agri-food strategy 
board 2013) 
Northern 
Ireland 
The objectives for achieving 
food security are: 
• Growing Market Share
• Working Together
• Sustainable Growth
• Innovation,
entrepreneurship and
skills
• Better regulation
• Financing growth
• Food fortress.
Similarly market-focused as 
the UK strategy, it also 
acknowledges a wider role 
for the Government to give 
strategic directions. 
It should be linked to UK 
food security strategy. 
WAG, Food for Wales, 
Food from Wales 2010-
2020, Food Strategy 
for Wales (WAG, 2010) 
Wales The pillars for the strategy 
are: 
• Market development
• Food culture
• Sustainability and well-
being
• Supply chain efficiency
• Integration.
It should be linked to UK 
food security strategy. 
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Table 7.A1. Food policy framework 
Similarly market-focused as 
the UK strategy, it puts a 
larger emphasis on the 
supply chain. 
Common Agricultural 
Policy England (2014)16 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Scotland 
(2015)17 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Wales (2015)18 
Common Agricultural 
Policy Northern Ireland 
(2014)19 
England, 
Scotland, Wales 
and Northern 
Ireland 
Basic payments, subject to 
cross-compliance rules, 
which include the use of 
Standards of Good 
Agricultural and 
Environmental Condition 
(GAEC) and Statutory 
Management Requirements 
(SMR). 
Additional support, provided 
to fund restoration, agri-tech 
and support to business 
growth. 
Greening is mandatory and 
subject to: crop 
diversification, permanent 
grassland and ecological 
focus areas. 
The schemes are similar 
among the four UK countries, 
with some minor differences 
(e.g. in Scotland, the scheme 
also introduces a voluntary 
coupled support aiming to 
maintain the current level of 
beef and sheep farmers in 
particular areas). 
They influence domestic 
agricultural production. 
16 https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/common-agricultural-policy-introduction-to-the-new-cap-
schemes 
17 http://www.gov.scot/Topics/farmingrural/Agriculture/CAP/CAP2015 
18 http://gov.wales/docs/drah/publications/140114directpaymentstofarmers-decisionsen.pdf 
19 http://www.dardni.gov.uk/index/grants-and-funding/common-agricultural-policy-reform.htm 
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Table 7.A1. Food policy framework 
HM Government, A UK 
Strategy for 
Agricultural 
Technologies (Agri-
tech strategy) (2013) 
UK The strategy aims to ‘match 
the UK world-leading basic 
research capability with a 
renewed focus on applied 
research in order to bring 
innovations onto farms and 
raise productivity.’ 
Trade in Animals and 
Related Products 
(TARP) Regulations 
2011 
The Trade in Animals 
and Related Products 
(Scotland) Regulations 
2012 
The Trade in Animals 
and Related Products 
(Wales) Regulations 
2011 
The Trade in Animals 
and Related Products 
Regulations (Northern 
Ireland) 2011  
England, 
Scotland, Wales 
and Northern 
Ireland 
The regulations establish 
controls on food imported 
from countries outside the 
EU. 
The EU Official 
Controls Regulation 
882/2004 
The Official Feed and 
Food Controls 
(England) Regulations 
2009 
The Official Feed and 
Food Controls 
(Scotland) Regulations 
2009 
The Official Feed and 
Food Controls (Wales) 
Regulations 2009 
The Official Feed and 
Food Controls 
(Northern Ireland) 
Regulations 2009 
England, 
Scotland, Wales 
and Northern 
Ireland 
Main legislation for the 
control of food not of animal 
origin entering the UK from 
non-EU countries. 
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Table 7.A1. Food policy framework 
EC Regulation 
852/2004, the Food 
Hygiene Regulation 
UK Food imported from non-EU 
countries must also comply 
with the food hygiene 
requirements established by 
this regulation. 
Source: CCRA analysis. 
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Table 7.A2. Migration policy framework 
            Policy reference   UK nation Key effects of this 
policy in addressing 
climate risks  
Links to other policies 
Labour migration UK None Related to settlement 
patterns. Labour 
market effects and 
service provision. 
EU free movement 
legislation and 
associated 
jurisprudence. 
UK None Related to settlement 
patterns. Labour 
market effects and 
service provision. 
Asylum UK None Engagement with 
phase 1 of the EU’s 
asylum policy (CEAS) 
establishing minimum 
standards for asylum 
applicants, but not 
further development of 
the CEAS. 
EU Global Approach to 
Migration and Mobility 
EU The EU’s global 
migration strategy 
(GAMM) contributed to 
international discourse 
on the migration-
development and the 
migration–climate 
change nexus while, in 
subsequent follow-up 
work, making the link 
between migration 
and strategies of 
adaptation to climate 
change. 
Links to UK and EU 
development, 
adaptation, poverty 
reduction and foreign 
and security policies. 
EU European Agenda on 
Migration (2015) 
EU wide Climate change, 
persecution, civil war 
and poverty all 
identified as possible 
drivers of 
displacement. 
Links to UK and EU 
development, 
adaptation, poverty 
reduction and foreign 
and security policies. 
Source: CCRA analysis. 
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Table 7.A3. Geopolitical policy framework 
    Policy reference UK nation Key effects of this policy in 
addressing climate risks  
Links to other policies 
International 
Development Act 
(2015) 
UK The Act defines the 
Government expenditure in 
overseas aid to be at least 
0.7% of its gross national 
income. Current expenditure 
amounts to about £11Bn, and 
the 2004-2014 average 
amounts to over 7Bn20. 
This percentage is a 
requirement from OECD’s 
Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC). 
International Climate 
Fund (2011) 
UK A £3.4 billion fund spanning 
2011 – 2016. The fund is 
managed by DFID, DECC and 
Defra and aims to help target 
countries to adapt to climate 
change and reduce their 
emissions. 
National Security 
Strategy (HM 
Government, 2015a) 
UK It recognises the role of 
climate change as ‘risk 
multiplier’ that would 
aggravate existing pressures 
within or between countries. 
Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (2010) 
and Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy (HM 
Government, 2011) 
UK Recognises the links between 
development, state fragility 
and conflicts, thus aims to 
link SDGs and conflict 
preventions. 
National Security 
Strategy (HM 
Government, 2015a) 
Conflict, Stability and 
Security Fund (CSSF) 
(FCO, 2015) 
UK Fund for in-country 
interventions, to implement 
the Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy. In 
comparison to the previous 
Conflict Pool, this pool has a 
more of a top-down 
approach with a larger 
oversight from the National 
Security Council. 
Strategic Defence and 
Security Review (2015) 
and Building Stability 
Overseas Strategy (HM 
Government, 2011). 
National Security 
Strategy (HM 
Government, 2015a) 
20  https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/department-for-international-development/about/statistics 
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Table 7.A3. Geopolitical policy framework 
The UK has tens of 
thousands of bilateral, 
multi-lateral 
agreements and 
conventions (FCO, 
2015) 
UK These agreements are 
relevant to maintain UK 
economic interests, such as 
maintaining an open and 
stable international trade. 
These agreements have also 
a role in buffering the other 
risks discussed in this 
chapter, including flood 
safety, migration, and 
geopolitical risks. 
Food safety policies 
EU migration agreements 
International 
Development Act 
Common Agricultural 
Policies 
Etc. 
Source: CCRA analysis. 
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Annex 7.B Overview of global food production and trade 
For major agricultural commodities, a significant proportion of total global production is now 
traded internationally (Liapis, 2012). Trade flow in wheat and rice has more than doubled in 
recent decades (Puma et al., 2015). 
In Figure 7.B1, the share of world exports for the main wheat exporters for 1995 is compared 
with that for 2010, highlighting how these shares have changed over time: taken together, in 
2010, Russia and the Ukraine accounted for 11% of world wheat exports with the role of the 
more ‘established’ suppliers declining: the US accounted for less than 20% of world wheat 
exports in 2010. On the one hand, there is a positive dimension to this insofar as world wheat 
exports are now more diversified. On the other hand, there is an issue of reliability from the new 
export suppliers given the incidence of weather-related shortfalls in recent years combined with 
the use of export taxes by the Ukraine and Russia to prioritise domestic food availability 
(Fellmann et al., 2014). 
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Figure 7.B1. Concentration and changing structure of world wheat exports: 1995 and 2010 
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Source: FAOSTAT data, quantities of wheat exports by country.21 
21 http://faostat.fao.org/site/342/default.aspx 
Chapter 7   –   International dimensions              59
UK Climate Change Risk Assessment 2017: Evidence Report 
Figure 7.B2 illustrates the growing importance of Russia and the Ukraine as exporters to world 
markets since the early 1990s. The figure also highlights the volatility of exports from these 
countries that could arise due to the combination of climate-related events and associated 
policy responses. 
Figure 7.B2. Russia and Ukraine in world wheat markets, 1992 – 2011 
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UK food production, export and import patterns have changed since the end of the last century. 
For example, UK self-sufficiency was 60% in 2013 from a high of around 90% in the early 1980s 
(Figure 7.B3). These changes reflect structural change in the economy over time and also 
changing priorities of agricultural support policy in the EU. Second, the supply of commercial 
food in the UK is increasingly based on ‘just-in-time’ delivery; the majority of food stock levels 
have fallen during the last five years (Defra, 2015b). 
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Figure 7.B3. UK Food Self-Sufficiency, 1956 – 2013 
Source: Defra (2012c). 
The UK takes advantage of international trade for both imports and exports: 7% of total exports 
(£18.9 billion), and 10% of total imports (£40.2 billion) are of agri-food products22. Its principal 
trading partner is the EU, but the UK import from 168 countries in total (Defra, 2012a). Self-
sufficiency can be calculated in different ways: 
• Using farm-gate values of total production, we are 53% self-sufficient23;
• If we subtract exports, we are 62% self-sufficient, and
• For consumption of food that we produce locally, we are 78% self-sufficient24.
The difference between the first two highlights the difference between what we produce and 
what we use. For example, we produce about 781kT of pork, export about 183kT and import 
about 729kT25. If we divide what we produce by our use (production minus exports plus imports) 
we are 59% self-sufficient, whereas if we divide what we produce and do not export by what we 
use we are 45%. Most of what we export and import is not raw agricultural produce but 
22 http://www.wto.org/statistics 
23 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/183302/foodpocketbook-
2012edition-09apr2013.pdf 
24 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208436/auk-2012-25jun13.pdf 
25 https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/208436/auk-2012-25jun13.pdf 
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processed food and drink (of the £40 billion of imports, £14.4 billion is highly and £17.8 billion is 
lightly processed). The largest categories for imports are fruit and vegetables, meat and drinks; 
and the largest export categories are beverages, cereals, meat and fish. 
UK imports tend to be highly concentrated for a range of key commodities. For example, around 
85% of wheat imports to the UK are sourced from the EU (approximately 50% of the total 
imports), Canada (34%) and the US (1%). Similarly high levels of concentration across import 
sources are evident for other commodity groups though the trading countries will differ. Brazil 
accounts for around 75% of UK soybean imports, with the remaining 25% being imported from 
elsewhere. Soybean is important for animal production.  
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Annex 7.C Climate impacts: from global food production to world prices 
to domestic prices 
The complex nature of the global food pricing system means that, in gauging the risks to the UK 
associated with these extreme climate events, it is important to account for not just the 
magnitude of the production shocks but also how they interact with other short-term drivers of 
world food prices. While we can consider the impact of extreme events on prices and trade, the 
nature of the price dynamics associated with extreme climate events will likely differ and, by 
extension, so too will the appropriate action to counter the risks associated with these events. 
Global food prices are a key factor in determining the impacts of climate change on UK food 
security. The evidence from economic models for price increases over the coming decades is 
mixed, while post-2050 climate change is expected to result in higher real food prices (AR5 
Chapter 7). Increasing prices imply reduced access for the poorest. However, the economic 
models used for these assessments are (of necessity) general equilibrium models, which cannot 
account for price fluctuations due to production shocks or other causes. Similarly, assessments 
of UK impacts (PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2013) have used total imports as the metric 
for availability, without accounting for any increased imports resulting from high demand. 
Extreme climate events impacts on the food system 
Impacts on production 
The other dimension linking climate to food security is the impact on production shocks 
associated with extreme climate events such as droughts, heatwaves, flooding, cyclones and so 
on. As Schmidhuber and Tubiello (2007) note, while most modelling efforts focus on mean 
effects over a relatively long time period, the shorter-run impacts associated with extreme 
climate events will have a more immediate impact on food security. To provide some 
perspective on extreme climate events, the WMO has noted in its recent report, the number of 
extreme events has increased over the last decade and has been associated with heatwaves, 
drought, flooding, etc. (WMO, 2013). While there is some debate as to whether the rising 
incidence of extreme climate events are associated with climate change, it is nevertheless the 
case that the immediacy of extreme climate events, especially if they have increasing incidence 
in future years, will have a more immediate impact on the UK, both in terms of the economic 
impact and how policymakers respond both in the UK and elsewhere. 
Impacts on world prices 
The emphasis of recent research on climate and food security has primarily focused on 
evaluating long-run effects, i.e. estimates of price changes through to 2050; research on the 
specific effect of extreme climate events on the relatively short-run impact on world agricultural 
prices is generally lacking. Nelson et al. (2010) is an exception to this where they simulate the 
effect of an extended drought in South-East Asia. The risks to the UK associated with production 
shocks associated with extreme events can result in a different perspective on the impact of 
world food prices, the interplay between climate events and other factors, and how the UK 
government should respond to ameliorate this risk. 
While it is clear that a production shock will drive world prices up, the magnitude of the effect 
will depend on the interaction of the extreme climate event with other factors. As noted above, 
the disruption to global production need not be significant enough to result in a price spike. 
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There are two important factors to account for, given the recent experience of the commodity 
price spikes of 2007 – 2008 and 2011. First, foreign governments will not be immune to 
prioritising domestic issues over global issues with government decisions over trade policy 
choices in face of rising world prices being a key factor to recent price spikes (see Martin and 
Anderson, 2012). 
Second, the effect of a production shortfall on the world will depend on the availability of stocks. 
The experience of the recent price spikes was that stocks have decreased in comparison with the 
demand over the 2000s. This reduced the capability to make up for commodity shortfalls. 
In other words, the scarcer a good is, the higher its price will be (all other factors that determine 
price assumed to remain constant). The change in a given year’s production will affect the price. 
The effect of a given year’s production on the price will be less if there are high stocks of that 
produce. Similarly, low stocks exacerbate the effect of a production shock on price changes. 
In sum, the concern for the UK about extreme climate events is not just that they will happen 
and may happen with increasing frequency, which will have the potential to make world prices 
more volatile, but the extent of the world price change will depend on the (global) availability of 
stocks and how foreign governments respond. These issues are important in assessing the 
impact on the UK and also have implications for the policy space for the UK government. 
Long-run climate change impacts 
Impacts on production 
Climate modellers have focused on the impact of climate change on yields over a 30 – 40 year 
period using biophysical–economic models that can identify the potential impact of climate 
change on productivity and production, and identify the geographical impact of these changes 
across broadly defined regional groupings and the resulting effect on net trade and world prices 
for key agricultural commodities.26 These effects are contingent on assumptions made about 
climate change mitigation (ranging from the no mitigation effect through to full mitigation) as 
well as defining the baseline related to other demand and supply drivers which will determine 
production changes and the effect on prices over the long run; these are discussed below. The 
modelling efforts differ in specification, the choice of variables to calibrate the models (e.g. price 
responsiveness of consumers and producers) and assumptions about the baseline scenarios. The 
specification of these models adds to the uncertainty associated with gauging the effects of 
climate change on food security.  
Nelson et al. (2014) provide a useful assessment of alternative modelling approaches and 
consider different climate scenarios. Employing nine modelling approaches, they consider 
common baseline scenarios such that the differences in the estimates lie in the details of the 
models being employed. The overwhelming assessment is that (area-weighted) global yields will 
fall, though the impact varies by crop and assumptions about CO2 fertilisation. The significance 
of CO2 fertilisation on the yield effect was also highlighted by Mueller and Binder (2015): they 
show that with no CO2 fertilisation, the (global) mean effect on yields will be a decline of around 
-6.5%; with full CO2 fertilisation, the mean effect on yields is an increase of around 13%. On the 
other hand, carbon dioxide negatively affects the protein content of most crops (Taub et al., 
26  Some models extend the estimate of price effects beyond 2050. 
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2008), reducing the nutritional quality of the final food (Blumenthal et al., 1996; Fernando et al., 
2012). Interactions with temperature can further reduce the protein content (Bai et al., 2005) and 
the subsequent quality of the bread. 
The yield effects also differ across regions; for example, Nelson et al. (2014) show that, even 
when the global mean effect is close to zero, some regions/countries experience an increase in 
yields; similar variations across regions are reported in Mueller and Binder (2010). Taking the 
productivity effect together with the area effect, climate change will have varying effects on 
agricultural production across regions and, in turn, trade. In the case of the latter, the pattern of 
global agricultural trade could change with some countries/regions switching from being net 
exporters to net importers and vice versa. In sum, the effect of climate change on the global 
food sector will not only impact on prices but also on the geography of production and trade; 
both of these have implications for assessing the potential risks that the UK is likely to face.27 
Box 7.C1. Robustness of evidence for changes in growing areas 
Numerous modelling studies have used multi-decadal climate change simulations to assess the 
impacts on crop yields. At the global scale, uncertainty is relatively low. The most comprehensive 
meta-analysis to date (Challinor et al., 2014a) found, in the absence of agronomic adaptation, 
reductions in global-scale aggregate yields of maize and wheat from one degree of local warming. 
Confidence in these global results is reasonably high, since they are consistent with historical climate-
induced yield changes (Bruckner et al., 2014). At the sub-global scale, projected reductions in yield in 
tropical regions are greater than those in temperate regions. Vulnerability to drought is also 
demonstrably greater in tropical regions (Simelton et al., 2012). 
Despite some certainty in the global-scale picture, significant uncertainties exist when examining 
individual countries. Yields in any one location will be affected by changing patterns of heat stress, 
drought and flooding. Heat stress is the most predictable of these factors, with projections for the end 
of the century showing increases in heat stress on global maize, wheat, rice and soybean (e. g. Teixeira 
et al., 2011). 
The evidence for the robustness of climate change impact projections comes increasingly from 
detection and attribution. This can be carried out at large or small scales. Fisheries, which are 
particularly suited to global analyses, show a clear impact of warming: an increase in warmer water 
species captured at high latitudes, and a decrease of sub-tropical species at tropical latitudes (Cheung 
et al., 2013). At smaller scales, water and food insecurity associated with climate change have been 
detected in many subsistence farming regions (Hofmeijer et al., 2012). 
There is robust evidence for negative effects of increased temperature on feed intake, reproduction, 
performance and pathogen geographical ranges for livestock (Adger et al., 2014). 
Climate change will alter the global distribution of pests and diseases. Evidence of temperature-
induced changes already exists, for example in the US, where a change in pesticide use across 
latitudinal gradients has been detected (Ziska, 2014). While models for projecting future prevalence do 
exist (e.g. Garrett et al., 2013), there are significant uncertainties (Meynard et al., 2013). 
27  To underpin the climate change effect across regions and crops, Lobell et al. (2011) show that climate change is 
already affecting yields: based on the period 1980 – 2008, wheat yields globally declined of approximately 5% 
due to climate change; but for Russia, the yield decrease has been estimated closer to 20% compared with a 
marginal increase in yields in the US. For soy, mean yields have declined by around 2% with increases in 
Argentina being largely offset by decreases in Brazil and Paraguay. 
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Impacts on world prices 
The impact of climate change via the productivity (yield) effect will depend on the role of other 
long-run drivers of agricultural commodity prices. These will occur on both the demand and 
supply side. On the demand side, the two main drivers are population growth and income 
growth. With respect to the former, with the world population increasing towards 10 billion, 
demand pressures will clearly increase but that is not the only factor: income growth particularly 
in South and East Asia will increase demand, but for more processed food. This has two effects: 
first, the increased demand will be a less efficient convertor of basic calories. Second, as average 
income increases consumers, on average, become less sensitive to price changes, so that 
increases in prices do not have as big a dampening effect on demand. However, this analysis is 
based on average: it does not take into account equity issues when there is already a vulnerable 
population; this is also the case in the UK. 
Demand-side drivers have also to be considered against the influence of supply-side drivers, 
essentially total factor productivity. Total factor productivity has increased in recent years and 
there is some dispute as to whether the effect of total factor productivity will outstrip the 
demand-side factors noted above. Taking the demand and supply drivers of world food prices 
together will determine the underlying baseline for the effect of climate change on world prices. 
Most research to date (with some exceptions) has emphasised the dominance of demand-side 
factors, such that the baseline for addressing the long-run impact of climate change comes 
against the background of a rising trend in world prices. 
The effect of climate on yield and production will be reflected in a change in the trend in world 
prices. On the assumption of inadequate mitigation, it is broadly anticipated that yields will fall, 
production patterns will change and world prices will rise, as discussed above. With reference to 
the climate–food modelling approaches assessed by Nelson et al. (2014), there is a wide range of 
estimates of the weighted average price change across five crops (coarse grains, oilseeds, rice, 
sugar and wheat) through to 2050. These depend on the climate change scenario but there is 
also significant variation across models on what the impact on prices will be, even given the 
common scenarios and common assumptions about baseline trends. 
Impacts on international trade 
Focusing on the world price impacts due to climate change is a useful shorthand for 
summarising the global impact of climate change on world agriculture. Changes in yield, 
production and net trade across different regions will be reflected in the market clearing 
mechanisms that accounts for these changes i.e. the world price. But changes in trade patterns 
will also matter and will be an added dimension of the effect on the UK if the current profile of 
trade in international food products changes. The effect on trade patterns is highlighted in the 
long-run assessments of climate change. Nelson et al. (2010) provide a review of these potential 
effects: for developed countries, they report that climate change effects will reduce the export 
potential for wheat exports (and similarly for maize), while, in the case of rice, climate change 
adds to the import demand from developed countries. For low-income countries, net exporters 
of rice turn into net importers. One potential issue for the UK given the changing profile of world 
trade that could arise with climate change is how other countries respond to their net trade 
status and how this ties with their own food security concerns. 
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From world prices to domestic prices 
Both the long-run and short-run effects of climate change in the world food sector are 
manifested through the effects on world prices, and by extension, the impact of world prices 
depends on domestic price changes through the price transmission effect. It is this latter 
mechanism which will determine the distributional impact within the UK. Availability may also 
matter (given the evidence related to the UK’s self-sufficiency and main trading partners) but 
given that global production shortfalls do not have to be that great to have a major impact on 
world prices as noted above, the most obvious mechanism for thinking about the links between 
climate change and food security is through world prices. However, in the context of the other 
drivers of prices, the extent of the price rise and what the relative importance of climate change 
effects on prices will be are unclear in these assessments. In terms of considering the 
consequences for the UK, it is important to recognise that world price changes do not 
necessarily translate 1:1 into corresponding changes in domestic prices. In short, depending on 
whether you are focusing on domestic farm-gate prices or domestic retail prices, price behaviour 
can be quite different to world prices. This is evident from Figure 7.C1, which shows world wheat 
food prices, UK retail prices and UK domestic producer prices; clearly, the dynamics of world 
price changes differs from that of price changes in the UK depending on which part of the food 
chain you are considering. 
Figure 7.C1. World food prices (WFPI), UK retail prices (UKFCPI) and UK domestic 
producer prices (UKAPPI) as percentage change compared to 2005 
Source: Office for National Statistics (ONS), Inflation and price indices.28 
28 https://www.ons.gov.uk/economy/inflationandpriceindices 
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The mechanism that determines the price effects within the UK when world market prices 
change is related to price transmission. 
There are two dimensions to this: 
1. Horizontal price transmission, which is the price change for the comparable commodity 
produced domestically relative to the world price. The data from Figure 7.C1 indicates that 
this horizontal price effect is strong.
2. Vertical price transmission, which relates to the price changes of the processed food
following a change on world (or domestic farm-gate) prices of the raw ingredients. The
impact of a production shock due to climate change affecting raw food on UK-consumed
processed food will be muted. This is because the raw commodity represents a small share of
the cost of the final processed food the consumer buys at retail. For example, if wheat
represents 20% of the cost share of bread, the rise in consumer prices will ‘only’ be 20% of
the change in world wheat prices. The structure of the food chain will have the potential to
dampen any effect due to production shocks, i.e. even with a cost share of 20%, the effect on
bread prices at retail will be less than 20% (Lloyd et al., 2015a). The experience of the UK
following recent events on world markets suggest that the UK was more exposed to world
price shocks relative to other EU Member States (see Lloyd et al., 2015); the effect on UK
consumers may be muted but the impact was greater compared with other members of the
EU highlighting the UK’s exposure to events from world markets. Even though price shocks
may be reduced as they pass through from world markets to domestic retail prices, the
poorest groups are more affected by these changes. Although expenditure on food
represents around 11% of total expenditure, for the lowest quintiles, the share of food
expenditure is closer to 16% (Defra, 2014b). As with estimates on global food security, it is
the poorest who likely suffer most from climate change.
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Annex 7.D Extreme weather events and their impact on global food system chokepoints 
Climate change will have a fundamental, widespread and long-term impact on the physical structures on which food trade depends, both directly 
and indirectly. The heightened frequency, intensity and impact of extreme weather events will result in more regular and more prolonged 
interruptions to transport infrastructure and trade chokepoints, risking food price volatility and the dislocation of food supply (Bailey and 
Wellesley, in press). 
Table 7.D1. Impact on global food system chokepoints from extreme weather events 
Infrastructural 
chokepoint 
Extreme 
weather 
event 
Degree of confidence Share of UK/global food trade 
at risk 
Nature of disruption to 
infrastructural 
chokepoint 
Precedent Further reading 
Mississippi 
River System 
Drought IPCC: high confidence in more 
intense droughts in North 
America (AR5 WGII – North 
America). Predication that low 
water levels during droughts 
will pose a growing threat to 
the reliability of inland 
navigation (AR5 WGII – North 
America).  
10% of UK soy imports and just 
under 30% of global soy supply 
is produced in the US, the 
majority of which travels to port 
along the Mississippi River and 
its tributaries.  
Low water levels cause 
navigational challenges, 
necessitating restrictions 
on the number of barges 
on the waterways and on 
the maximum draught of 
those barges.   
2012-13. Drought in the 
upper Midwest 
prompted the 
introduction of load 
restrictions.  
Rizzo, J. (2013): ‘How Drought 
on Mississippi River Impacts 
You’, 1 February 2013, National 
Geographic, 
http://news.nationalgeographi
c.com/news/2012/12/121207-
nation-mississippi-river-
drought-environment-
economy/ 
United States 
Gulf coast 
ports 
Storm 
surge 
IPCC: projection that sea-level 
rise of one metre combined 
with a seven-metre storm surge 
could flood over half of roads, 
waterways and railways in the 
Gulf Coast area (AR5 WGII – 
North America).  
The US imports over 20% of the 
UK’s maize exports, half of 
which enter the country via the 
Gulf Coast ports. A sixth of 
global soy supply is shipped 
from these same ports each 
year.  
Severe damage to 
inundated port 
infrastructure risks 
slowing operations for a 
sustained period. Extreme 
storm surges can cause 
the Mississippi River to 
flow backwards 
temporarily, causing 
damage to barges and to 
locks and dams upstream. 
2005. Hurricane Katrina 
caused a storm surge 
along the Gulf Coast 
that killed over 1,500 
people and flooded 80% 
of New Orleans in up to 
six metres of water. 
US National Oceanographic 
and Atmospheric 
Administration (undated): 
‘Storm Surge and Coastal 
Inundation’. 
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Table 7.7. Impact on global food system chokepoints from extreme weather events 
Panama Canal El Niño IPCC: High confidence that 
ENSO will continue to be the 
dominant mode of natural 
climate variability in the 21st 
century (AR5 WGI – Climate 
Phenomena and their 
Relevance for Future Regional 
Climate Change). 
5% of UK cereal imports, and 
over 10% of global cereal 
supply, transits the Panama 
Canal each year. 
Long periods of dry 
weather brought by a 
strong El Niño see water 
levels drop in the Gatun 
and Miraflores Lakes, 
restricting the passage 
through the canal of large 
vessels. 
2016. Depth restrictions 
were applied to ships 
transiting the Canal 
owing to low water 
levels brought by El 
Niño, affecting nearly a 
fifth of vessels using the 
Canal. 
Sohns, A. (2015): ‘Does Climate 
Change Threaten the Future of 
the Panama Canal?’, Huffington 
Post, 11 December 2015, 
www.huffingtonpost.com/ant
onia-sohns/does-climate-
change-threa_b_8519642.html 
Brazilian ports Landslide IPCC: Medium confidence in 
more frequent extreme rainfall 
events, bringing landslides and 
flash floods (AR5 WGII – Central 
and South America). Extreme 
flooding events along the 
southern coast of Brazil and the 
northern coast of Argentina 
may become more frequent 
(AR5 WGII – Central and South 
America).  
A fifth of the UK’s imported soy, 
and over 30% of global soy 
exports, is sourced from Brazil, 
the vast majority of which is 
shipped from these ports. 7% of 
UK fertilizer exports are 
destined for the same region. 
Landslides prompted by 
unusually heavy rainfall 
may render main roads 
impassable and leave 
debris within the port area 
itself, interrupting loading 
and unloading operations.  
2008. Landslides closed 
the Port of Paranaguá, 
contributing to 
economic losses of US$ 
350 million. 
FBDS/Lloyd’s (undated): 
Climate Change and Extreme 
Events in Brazil, 
www.lloyds.com/~/media/lloy
ds/reports/360/360%20climate
%20reports/fbdsreportonbrazil
climatechangeenglish.pdf 
Suez Canal Strong 
winds 
IPCC: medium confidence that 
changes to surface wind and 
waves, sea level, and storm 
intensity will increase the 
vulnerability of the shipping 
industry (WGII – The Ocean).  
57% of UK rice imports, and a 
sixth of UK barley exports, pass 
through the Suez Canal. A 
detour around the Cape of 
Good Hope would add 10 days’ 
sailing time between the 
Arabian Gulf and the UK. 
Strong winds bring 
dangerous sailing 
conditions, and may also 
drop debris along the 
canal, slowing traffic while 
obstacles are cleared.  
2015. Canal closed 
owing to strong winds 
for a number of days. 
Al Arabiya News (2015): ‘Storm 
Yohan lashes Mideast, shuts 
Suez Canal’, 12 February 2015, 
http://english.alarabiya.net/en
/News/middle-
east/2015/02/12/Storm-
Yohan-lashes-Mideast-shuts-
Suez-Canal-.html 
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Table 7.7. Impact on global food system chokepoints from extreme weather events 
Malacca Straits Haze Haze in Southeast Asia, the 
result of forest fires in 
Indonesia, is exacerbated by a 
strong El Niño event. IPCC has 
high confidence that ENSO will 
continue to have a formative 
effect on climate variability 
throughout this century (see 
above).  
8% of UK rice imports, and 
nearly a quarter of global rice 
trade, is shipped through the 
Straits of Malacca. 
Poor visibility renders 
navigation through the 
busy waterway difficult 
and heightens the risk of 
collision between vessels,. 
2013. Forest fires in 
drought-hit Indonesia 
caused a smoky haze to 
spread across the 
Malacca Straits, 
prompting the 
Singapore Shipping 
Association to warn of 
potential collisions 
owing to dangerous 
conditions.  
Marine Executive (2013): 
‘Singapore Gravely Concerned 
About Indonesian Haze 
Impairing Ship Navigation’, 21 
June 2013, www.maritime-
executive.com/article/Singapo
re-Gravely-Concerned-About-
Indonesian-Haze-Impairing-
Ship-Navigation-2013-06-21 
Indian 
Subcontinent 
ports 
Floods IPCC: high confidence that 
extreme climate events, 
including floods, will have an 
increasing impact on human 
health and security in Asia (AR5 
WGII – Asia). Observed trend of 
increasingly frequent extreme 
weather events in South Asia 
(AR5 WGII – Asia). 
The UK sources around a third 
of its rice from India, and a 
further sixth from Pakistan. 
Together, the two countries 
account for 35% of global rice 
exports.  
Inundation of the roads 
and railways leading to 
major ports will cause 
delays to the loading and 
unloading of vessels. 
Resulting delays, and 
damage to storage 
infrastructure at the port, 
risk the stranding of 
perishable assets. Severe 
flooding may cause 
damage to port 
infrastructure and 
superstructure that takes 
weeks or even months to 
repair.  
2011. Severe flooding in 
the port of Karachi, and 
of the roads, railways 
and bridges 
surrounding the port, 
interrupted the export 
and import of goods for 
a period of months 
Al Jazeera (2011): ‘Flooding 
cripples southern Pakistan’, 14 
September 2011, 
www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/
2011/09/20119137252386886
6.html 
Source: Bailey and Wellesley (in press). 
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